Bodies of the Cheka-KGB: Soviet experience. See what "MGB" is in other dictionaries

April 1943 - March 1953

By Decree of the Presidium Supreme Council USSR on April 14, 1943, from the NKVD of the USSR, again, as in 1941, the independent People's Commissariat of State Security of the USSR (NKGB USSR) was separated, the head of which was again entrusted to V.N. Merkulov.

Military counterintelligence (MCI), just as it was in 1941, was transferred by Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 415-138ss of April 19, 1943 to the People's Commissariat of Defense and the People's Commissariat of the Navy of the USSR. The Main Counterintelligence Directorate (GUKR) "Smersh" of the NPO of the USSR and the Counterintelligence Directorate (UCR) "Smersh" of the NK Navy were created.

The structure of the NKGB of the USSR was determined by the decision of the Politburo P 40/91 of April 14, 1943 “On the formation of the NKGB of the USSR” and announced by resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 393-129ss of April 14, 1943. Somewhat later, by resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 621-191 ss of 2 June 1943, the “Regulations on the People's Commissariat for State Security of the USSR” was approved. In accordance with the resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 393-129ss of April 14, 1943, B.Z. Kobulov was appointed first deputy people's commissar of state security, and by resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 511 of May 11, 1943, M. was appointed deputy people's commissar of state security of the USSR for personnel. G. Svinelupov.

During May 1943, by orders of the NKGB of the USSR, the staff of the main structural divisions of the central apparatus of the NKGB of the USSR was approved:

1 department (intelligence);

2nd directorate (counterintelligence) (created on the basis of the 2nd and 3rd directorates, EKU and 3rd s/o NKVD of the USSR);

3 management (transport);

4 management (organization of terror and sabotage in the territories occupied by the Germans);

5 control (encryption-decryption and special communications);

6th department (protection of party and government leaders) (created on the basis of the 1st department of the NKVD of the USSR);

Department “A” (recording and archival) (created from parts of the departments and personnel of the 1st s/o NKVD of the USSR transferred to the NKGB of the USSR);

Department "B" (operational and technical);

Department "B" (military censorship and censorship of correspondence);

Investigative part for particularly important cases;

Secretariat of the NKGB of the USSR;

Personnel Department of the NKGB of the USSR;

Administrative and economic financial management(AHFU).

Thus, created in 1943, the NKGB of the USSR included seven directorates (together with the Akhfu), four independent departments “A”, “B”, “C” and OK, an investigative unit and a secretariat.

Until 1946, this structure underwent minor changes.

On November 15, 1945, “for operational and security service” of special-purpose facilities (engaged in the creation of an atomic bomb), department “K” was organized within the NKGB of the USSR.

By joint order of the NKGB and the NKVD of the USSR No. 0014/0032 of January 10, 1946, department “C” (reconnaissance and processing of materials on the atomic problem) was transferred from the NKVD of the USSR to the NKGB of the USSR.

By order of the NKGB of the USSR No. 00107 of March 22, 1946, in accordance with the resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of March 15, 1946, the NKGB of the USSR was renamed the Ministry of State Security of the USSR (MGB of the USSR). Accordingly, local departments and departments of the NKGB were renamed into departments and departments of the MGB.

A significant reorganization took place in the 6th Directorate of the USSR MGB. By order of the USSR MGB No. 00134 dated April 15, 1946, on its basis, the Security Directorate No. 2 of the USSR MGB was created, and the 1st Department of the 6th Directorate, which was responsible for the protection of Stalin, was transformed into the Security Directorate No. 1. The staff of the Security Directorate No. 1 were announced by order of the USSR MGB No. 00152 dated April 24, 1946. Thus, the organization of Stalin’s security (Security Directorate No. 1) was separated from the security of the remaining members of the Politburo and the Government (Security Directorate No. 2).

A radical expansion and change in the structure of the USSR MGB took place on May 4, 1946, when V.S. Abakumov was appointed instead of V.N. Merkulov as Minister of State Security of the USSR, and the GUKR "Smersh" of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, headed by him, joined the USSR MGB. The decision on this was made by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks P 51 /IV dated May 4, 1946. According to this decision, military counterintelligence was included in the USSR MGB as an independent 3rd Main Directorate of the USSR MGB. The 1st and 2nd Directorates of the USSR MGB were also transformed into Main Directorates. In addition, new directorates and independent departments emerged. As a result of these changes, the structure of the USSR MGB acquired the following form:

1 Main Directorate (intelligence);

2 Main Directorate (counterintelligence);

3 Main Directorate (military counterintelligence);

4th Directorate (search) (managed the search for “foreign intelligence agents abandoned in the USSR, and other enemy elements”) (the previously existing 4th Directorate for organizing terror and sabotage behind enemy lines during the war was abolished by order of the USSR Ministry of State Security No. 00447 of October 9 1946);

5 management (operational);

6 control (encryption-decryption);

Transport Department (security service for transport);

Security Directorate No. 1 (security of I.V. Stalin);

Security Department No. 2 (security of other party and government leaders);

Office of the Commandant of the Moscow Kremlin;

Department "A" (accounting and archiving);

Department "B" (operational equipment);

Department "B" (correspondence reading);

Department "D" (examination and forgery of documents) (separated from department "B");

Department "K" (Chekist surveillance at nuclear industry facilities);

Department "O" (operational work on the clergy of all denominations) (separated from Department 2);

Department "R" (radio counterintelligence);

Department "C" (translation and processing of materials on the atomic problem. In 1946, the functions of this department were transferred to the 1st Main Directorate of the MGB);

Department "T" (fighting "individuals voicing terrorist threats against party and Soviet leaders");

Investigative unit for particularly important cases (with management rights);

Department "DR" (service for carrying out sabotage and acts of individual terror);

Department "DN" (disinformation service) (in fact, this department was not created);

Administrative, economic and financial management (AHFM);

Human Resources Department;

Inspectorate under the Minister;

Secretariat of the USSR MGB;

Legal Bureau of the USSR MGB.

In the second half of 1946, several more significant reorganizations of some structural units of the central apparatus of the USSR MGB took place. Based on the results of checking the work of the NKGB - MGB of the USSR, reflected in the act of acceptance and transfer of cases from the former minister Merkulov to the new one - Abakumov, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted decision P 53/39 of August 20, 1946 on the need to change the structure of the MGB of the USSR. As a result, the following were created:

Department of Operational Equipment (OOT) (production of operational equipment and supplying local authorities with it) (the use of operational equipment remained the prerogative of Department “B”);

Prison Department (management of MGB prisons both in the center and on the periphery) (organized by order of the USSR MGB No. 00396 of September 27, 1946);

A special meeting with the minister (to make out-of-court decisions on investigative cases conducted by the MGB). (The staff of the secretariat of the OSO MGB of the USSR was announced by order of the MGB of the USSR No. 00496 of November 2, 1946);

Administration of affairs (was organized on the basis of AHFU);

Economic management (organized on the basis of AHFU;)

Financial department (organized on the basis of AHFU).

At the end of 1946, a reorganization of the security apparatus of the country's leaders took place. By order of the USSR MGB No. 00558 of December 25, 1946, security departments No. 1 and No. 2 and the Office of the Commandant of the Moscow Kremlin were merged into the Main Security Directorate of the USSR MGB.

Basically, this structure of the USSR MGB remained until March 1953, before the merger of the MGB with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, however, it was constantly changing in detail. Operational departments were consolidated or disaggregated, their work profile changed, and, finally, new structural units were organized, associated with the transfer of part of the functions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministry of State Security. This was explained by the growing influence of Abakumov, his desire to reassign part of the apparatus of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to himself, on the one hand, and Stalin’s desire to create a powerful centralized state security service, on the other.

Already in January 1947, a joint order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security of the USSR No. 0074/0029 dated January 21, 1947 formalized the transfer of internal troops from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the MGB. The Main Directorate of Internal Troops of the MGB was formed. The regular number of troops was 68,582 people.

By order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security of the USSR No. 0075/0030 of January 21, 1947, the transport police were transferred from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Transport Department of the Ministry of State Security of the USSR. Soon, by order of the USSR MGB No. 00322 dated June 19, 1947, the Main Security Directorate of the USSR MGB for railway and water transport was organized. The basis for this reorganization was Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 2104-556SS dated June 17, 1947.

However, Stalin, strengthening the influence of the MGB in affairs within the country, deprived the MGB of one of the most important and traditional areas of application of forces: foreign intelligence. It was decided to unite all intelligence departments and services of the USSR (1st Main Directorate of the USSR Ministry of State Security, Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, intelligence and information structures of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, etc.) into a single apparatus.

By decision of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 1789-470ss of May 30, 1947, the Committee of Information (CI) under the Council of Ministers of the USSR was created, headed by V.M. Molotov.

In the structure of the USSR MGB, 1 Main Directorate was abolished due to the transfer of the functions of this department to the CI under the USSR Council of Ministers.

To summarize counterintelligence work and compile reference books, textbooks and information bulletins, by order of the USSR Ministry of State Security No. 00426 of August 22, 1947, a Special Bureau was organized under the minister.

1948

Based on the resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 1130-405ss of April 6, 1948, by joint order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security of the USSR No. 00369/0141 of April 9, 1948, troops for the protection of particularly important industrial facilities and railways. The number of troops was 7301 people.

In accordance with Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 3271 of September 17, 1947, by order of the USSR MGB No. 332 of July 28, 1948, the Central Accounting Department of the USSR MGB was organized.

1949

The State Repository of Valuables (GOKHRAN) was transferred from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the MGB. In this regard, on April 21, 1949, a special department of the USSR MGB was created.

In 1949, the external surveillance and installation service, i.e. operational functions were separated from the 5th directorate of the USSR MGB and by order of the USSR MGB No. 00293 dated September 10, 1949, an independent 7th directorate of the USSR MGB (operational) was created. In accordance with this decision, by order of the USSR MGB No. 00386 dated December 6, 1949, a new structure of the 5th Directorate of the USSR MGB was approved. Department "O" was abolished, and its functions were transferred to the 5th department. Now the main task of the 5th Directorate was to fight hostile and anti-Soviet elements, work against clerics and search for the authors and distributors of anti-Soviet leaflets and anonymous documents, i.e. functions of secret political management.

In 1949, changes also occurred in the Information Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Military intelligence was returned to the Ministry of the Armed Forces, and the CI itself was now listed under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. The functions of the CI under the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs continued to be reduced. External counterintelligence and security work in Soviet colonies abroad were transferred to the USSR MGB, where for these purposes the First Directorate was created by order of the USSR MGB No. 00333 of October 17, 1949.

By joint order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security of the USSR No. 00968/00334 dated October 17, 1949, the border troops and police, as well as the Military Construction Directorate (MAD), were transferred from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the MGB. Accordingly, the USSR MGB now included the Main Directorate of Border Troops, the Main Directorate of Police and the Military Construction Directorate.

Based on the decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of September 19, 1949, all encryption and decryption work from the MGB was transferred to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and, accordingly, the 6th department of the MGB was liquidated. This was formalized by order of the USSR Ministry of State Security No. 00369 dated November 15, 1949, and the Main Directorate of Special Services (GUSS) of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) was created in the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

1950

To ensure its own encryption communications and decryption, an encryption department was created in the USSR MGB by order No. 0035 of January 11, 1950; according to order of the USSR MGB No. 00443 of August 18, 1950, it became known as Department “C”.

On the basis of resolutions of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks No. P 77/309 and P 77/310 dated September 9, 1950, in the USSR MGB, on the basis of the “DR” department (special service), the following departments were created as departments subordinate directly to the minister:

Bureau No. 1 (by order of the USSR Ministry of State Security No. 00532 of September 28, 1950) for carrying out sabotage and terror abroad;

Bureau No. 2 (by order of the USSR Ministry of State Security No. 00533 of September 28, 1950) for carrying out terror (kidnappings and murders) in the USSR.

In accordance with the resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 3077-1286ss of July 14, 1950 on the transfer of special settlements from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the MGB (announced by a joint order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the MGB of the USSR No. 00464/00392 of July 21, 1950) to the MGB of the USSR (order of the MGB of the USSR No. 00552 dated November 16, 1950) the 9th Directorate of the USSR Ministry of State Security was organized to supervise exiles, deportees and special settlers. According to the staff announced by order of the USSR Ministry of State Security No. 0033 of January 15, 1951, the 9th Directorate consisted of five departments:

1st department - work on the regime, supervision, agent observation and study of the behavior, connections, mood of exiles, deportees and special settlers in order to prevent escapes and timely prevention of enemy manifestations (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, the central and northern zone of the USSR);

2nd department - the same (Urals, Siberia and Far East);

3rd department - preparation of resettlement sites, movement of contingents, accounting and information;

4th department - management of search units;

5th department - work on considering complaints, statements, investigative cases and giving conclusions on them.

On November 13, 1950, by order of the USSR MGB, the staff of a new structural unit in the Central Office of the MGB was announced - the Military Supply Directorate (UVS MGB USSR).

In accordance with the fact that the police were transferred to the MGB and all records and files of criminals were transferred there during 1950, the work of department “A” (recording and archival) was restructured by order of the USSR MGB No. 00565 of November 28, 1950 : sectors were created in the department instead of departments and a new regulation on Department “A” was adopted.

By the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on December 31, 1950, a Collegium of 19 members was created in the USSR MGB.

1951

In accordance with the resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 1482-748ss of May 6, 1951, by order of the USSR MGB No. 0034 of May 19, 1951, the internal troops of the MGB and the government communications troops were reorganized into the internal security of the MGB. The Main Directorate of Internal Security (GUVO) of the USSR Ministry of State Security was organized.

By order of the USSR MGB on July 18, 1951, the Military Prosecutor's Offices and Military Tribunals of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Troops were renamed the Military Prosecutor's Offices and Military Tribunals of the USSR MGB Troops.

By order of the USSR MGB No. 00783 of October 27, 1951, the Mobilization Department of the USSR MGB was organized.

In 1951, foreign intelligence was returned to the MGB from the CI under the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. By order of the USSR MGB No. 00796 of November 2, 1951, the 1st Main Directorate (Intelligence) of the USSR MGB was created, which included the entire 1st directorate with its own staff and personnel.

1952

In accordance with the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 615-200ss of February 2, 1952, by order of the USSR Ministry of State Security No. 00100 of February 14, 1952, the Administration and the Economic Administration were merged into the Administrative and Economic Administration (AHU). At the same time, an independent Planning Department of the USSR Ministry of State Security was organized.

By order of the USSR MGB No. 00329 of May 23, 1952, the Main Directorate of the USSR MGB was transformed into the Security Directorate (DO) of the USSR MGB. The head of the Main Directorate of the Ministry of State Security, Lieutenant General N.S. Vlasik, was removed from work, and the leadership of the security of the leaders of the party and government was entrusted to the Minister of State Security S.D. Ignatiev (part-time).

In accordance with the order of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 11826rs of May 16, 1952, by order of the USSR MGB No. 00383 of June 7, 1952, the Directorate of Educational Institutions of the USSR MGB was organized.

In accordance with Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 3851-1539с of August 22, 1952, by order of the USSR MGB No. 00763 of September 12, 1952, the Main Directorate of the USSR MGB for control and inspection of departmental security was organized.

1953

On the initiative of I.V. Stalin, a decision was made by the Bureau of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee BP 7/12-op dated December 30, 1952 to unite the 1st and 2nd Main Directorates and a number of other divisions of the central apparatus of the MGB into the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the MGB of the USSR. This decision was announced by order of the USSR Ministry of State Security No. 006 dated January 5, 1953. At the same time, Stalin decided to reorganize the entire external surveillance service and operational work of the 7th Directorate. However, these projects (the formation of the GRU and the reorganization of the 7th Directorate) were not completed and their staffing was never approved until Stalin’s death.

By order of the USSR Ministry of State Security No. 0085 of January 26, 1953, the Central Bureau of Rationalization and Invention was organized.

On January 10, 1946, L.P. Beria was relieved of his post as People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, and S.N. Kruglov was appointed in his place. On March 15, by a resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the People's Commissariats were transformed into ministries. By order of the Minister of State Security No. 00134 of April 15, 1946, on the basis of the 1st Department of the VI Directorate of the USSR Ministry of State Security, Security Directorate No. 1 was created (Stalin’s security, head - N. S. Vlasik), on the basis of the 2nd Department - Security Directorate No. 2 (security of members of the Politburo and government, D. N. Shadrin). On May 4, V.S. Abakumov was appointed Minister of State Security instead of V.N. Merkulov, and the Main Counterintelligence Directorate SMERSH was reorganized into the III Main Counterintelligence Directorate of the Ministry of State Security. By order of the Minister of State Security No. 00558 of December 25, 1946, on the basis of security departments No. 1 and No. 2 and the Office of the Commandant of the Moscow Kremlin, the Main Security Directorate of the USSR Ministry of State Security was created under the leadership of Vlasik.

At the end of 1946, the structure of the MGB was as follows:
– secretariat;
- Secretariat of the Special Meeting under the Minister;
- inspection under the minister;
– 1st Main Directorate (intelligence – Fitin P.M.);
– 2nd Main Directorate (counterintelligence – P.V. Fedotov);
– 3rd Main Directorate (military counterintelligence);
– 4th department (investigative);
– 5th Directorate (operational);
– 6th department (encryption-decryption – Shevelev I.G.);
- Transport Department;
– Main Security Directorate (N.K. Spiridonov);
– investigative unit for particularly important cases (Vlodzimirsky L.E.);
– business management;
- economic management (Smirnov P.P.);
– HR department (Svinelupov M.G.);
– Department “A” (accounting and archiving; controlled the work of all archives of the USSR - Gertsovsky A.Ya.);
– Department “B” (use of operational equipment: wiretapping, etc. – Lapshin E.P.);
– department “B” (censorship and censorship of correspondence – Gribov V.M.);
– department “D” (production and examination of documents);
– department “DR” (sabotage and reconnaissance – Sudoplatov P.A.);
– Department “K” (counterintelligence support for nuclear industry facilities);
– department “O” (for operational work among the clergy);
– department “R” (radio counterintelligence);
– department “T” (anti-terrorism);
– department of operational technology (laboratory where its development was carried out);
– prison department (including the internal prison of the MGB, the commandant of which was the head of this department);
- financial department;
– legal office
In January 1947, the Main Directorate of Internal Troops was created in the MGB.
In August 1947, government communications troops were transferred to the MGB. And in March 1949, the Gokhran (State Repository of Valuables) was transferred to the jurisdiction of the MGB, for the management of which a Special Department was created.
In September 1949, the external surveillance and installation service was separated from the 5th Directorate of the MGB into a separate, 7th Directorate.
At the same time, in October 1949, the Main Directorate of Police was transferred from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the MGB, and the Border Troops and Military Construction Department were subordinated to the MGB.
In September 1950, on the basis of the sabotage and reconnaissance department of the MGB, Bureau No. 1 (special operations abroad) and Bureau No. 2 (special operations within the country) were created.
On November 16, 1950, the 9th department was created in the MGB to “serve” special settlers. Their number was constantly increasing: due to the “cleansing” of liberated areas, re-collectivization, “filtration” of former prisoners of war, deportations from Eastern European countries, and so on.

On July 12, 1951, the Minister of State Security V. S. Abakumov was arrested, and on August 9 S. D. Ignatiev was appointed minister. May 23, 1952 The Main Security Directorate was reorganized into the Directorate, its staff was reduced from 14,000 to 3,000 people, all economic structures and departments in charge of ensuring the security of the buildings of the Central Committee, the Council of Ministers, the General Staff, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, government halls at railway stations, government highways were abolished . On May 29, Vlasik was removed from work and transferred to the deputy head of the Bazhenov forced labor camp in the city of Asbest (Sverdlovsk region). The MGB Security Department was assigned to head the Minister of State Security Ignatiev.
The initiator of the removal of Vlasik, one of the most loyal people to Stalin, was Beria. In November 1952, also on Beria’s initiative, Poskrebyshev was removed from his post (motivation - possibly related to the “doctors’ case”). On December 16, Vlasik was arrested, he was accused of “indulging sabotage doctors,” abuse of official position, etc. Among the serious official omissions, it should be noted that Vlasik improperly stored top secret documents, including topographic maps Moscow region and Potsdam.

In April 1952, under the Minister of State Security, a Special Bureau (analytical) was created: it became obvious that the Party Central Committee could not effectively carry out such work. The 1st Main Directorate of the MGB, the intelligence department, was also restored. In January 1953, the creation of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the MGB, on the basis of the 1st, 2nd and a number of other departments and departments of the MGB, was announced, but due to the death of Stalin it did not come into force.

By June 1952, the MGB apparatus consisted of 207,000 employees. In addition, border guards were considered employees of the MGB - as of January 1, 1953, about 190,000 people, internal troops - 69,000 people, troops protecting industrial facilities and railways - 7,500 people.
The MGB intelligence apparatus consisted of residents, agents and informants, but from January 1952 (MGB Order No. 0015) new categories were introduced instead: agent and special agent. All former agents and informants were transferred to the category of agents, and the most qualified ones performing responsible tasks were transferred to special agents. From now on, only the heads of MGB departments and higher-ranking officers had the right to recruit agents. By the same order, from March 15, 1952, the number of agents was reduced by approximately half.

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Section articles

Rus' AND THE WEST 12-13th centuries.

At the end of the 11th - beginning of the 12th centuries. Rus' entered an extremely contradictory period called feudal fragmentation, which lasted until the middle of the 15th century.

MISTAKE OF VASILY THE DARK

Grand Duke For the time being, Vasily II the Dark of Moscow was not distinguished by the foresight and caution of his grandfather, Dmitry Donskoy.

SECRET EXPEDITION

In February 1762, in place of the destroyed Office of Secret Investigative Affairs Peter III established a Special Expedition under the Senate in charge of issues of political investigation.

SPECIAL OFFICE

In 1810, Minister of War Barclay de Tolly raised the question of organizing a permanent strategic military intelligence body to Alexander I.

GENERAL SECURITY COMMITTEE

At the suggestion of Count N.N. Novosiltsev On January 13, 1807, a Committee was formed to consider cases of crimes tending to violate the general peace (Committee of General Security).

MINISTRY OF POLICE

During the public administration reform carried out by Speransky, who used French experience, the Ministry of Police was established on June 25, 1811.

CORPS OF GENDARMES

In Russia, the name gendarmerie was first mentioned in 1792 in connection with the establishment of a special cavalry team as part of the troops of Grand Duke Pavel Petrovich

1917-1922	Cheka under the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR
1922-1923	GPU under the NKVD of the RSFSR
1923-1934	OGPU under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR
1934-1946	NKVD USSR
1934-1943	GUGB NKVD USSR
1941, 1943-1946	NKGB USSR
1946-1953	MGB USSR
1946-1954	Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR
1954-1978	KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR
1978-1991	KGB USSR

Features determined by the historical, geopolitical and ethnic conditions of the Russian Empire, the experience of the activities of its special services, mainly undercover work and conspiracy, were implemented by the Bolsheviks after October revolution. Being in a constant struggle with the regime and observing both the strengths and weaknesses of the activities of its intelligence services, they were able to create, perhaps, one of the most powerful system of special services in the world. She allowed Communist Party ensure its political dominance in the country for more than 70 years and successfully resist external threats.

V.I. Lenin and the first chairman of the Cheka, F. Dzerzhinsky, created this state institution as a “combat detachment of the party,” that is, as a party-state intelligence service with a clear ideological orientation towards a decisive struggle against political and ideological opponents.

The extreme conditions of counter-revolutionary opposition to the power of the Bolsheviks, the unfolding civil war and foreign intervention justified such a basis for the creation of the special services of the Soviet state. The Cheka, and then the GPU and OGPU acted decisively and offensively, skillfully seizing the initiative from their opponents, who were much more experienced. The personnel of the security agencies of the RSFSR, and later the USSR, were, without a doubt, deeply devoted to communist ideas. And although the general educational level of most of the management, not to mention the operational staff, was low, a clear political line, revolutionary pathos, a sense of exclusivity instilled in the security officers from the first day of service, made the Soviet state security agencies for 10-12 years one of the most powerful intelligence services in the world.

State security agencies have undergone more than ten reorganizations since their creation, with half of them occurring in the period 1991-1994.

The original name is known to everyone - it is the Cheka (1917). After graduation civil war in 1922, a new abbreviation appeared - GPU. Following the formation of the USSR, the United GPU (OGPU USSR) arose on its basis. In 1934, the OGPU was merged with the internal affairs bodies (police) and the Union-Republican People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs was formed. G. Yagoda became People's Commissar, then N. Yezhov. L. Beria was appointed People's Commissar of Internal Affairs in 1938. In February 1941, the People's Commissariat of State Security (NKGB) was separated from this united structure as an independent one. In July 1941 he was again returned to the NKVD, and in 1943 he was again separated into long years into an independent structure - the NKGB, renamed in 1946 into the Ministry of State Security. Since 1943 it was headed by V. Merkulov.

After Stalin's death, Beria once again united the internal affairs bodies and state security bodies into a single ministry - the Ministry of Internal Affairs and headed it himself. Then S. Kruglov became the Minister of Internal Affairs.

In March 1954, the State Security Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR was created, separated from the Ministry of Internal Affairs. I. Serov was appointed its chairman. In this post he was successively replaced by A. Shelepin, V. Semichastny, Yu. Andropov (he was in this position for about 15 years), V. Fedorchuk, V. Chebrikov, V. Kryuchkov, L. Shebarshin, V. Bakatin.

Appointed after August 1991 to the post of Chairman of the KGB of the USSR, V. Bakatin developed and began to implement the concept of disintegration of the KGB, i.e. fragmenting it into a number of independent departments in order to deprive it of its monopoly in the sphere of ensuring state security of the country. From the KGB, the Security Directorate, the Foreign Intelligence Service, FAPSI, Border Troops, and special-purpose divisions were transferred to the jurisdiction of the President.

After such “transformations,” the KGB of the USSR ceased to exist and from November 1991 began to be called the Inter-Republican Security Service (MSB USSR).

Throughout all 74 years of its existence, organs. The Cheka-KGB were a unique state organization, and their activities were comprehensive both in terms of the level of tasks they solved and in covering almost all spheres of life of the state and society. The bodies of the Cheka-KGB in the Center and locally, along with the CPSU and the Soviet system, were one of the three structural components of the Soviet state and social system. The rigid hierarchy of the KGB bodies, control, carried out along with party bodies, over the Armed Forces, the country's economy, national and cultural policy, foreign personnel, etc. made the State Security Committee a super-special service that had no analogues in the world before.

Naturally, an exceptional position in the state and society, the ability to quickly concentrate huge potential, if necessary, then of the entire society, to solve the tasks set by the party leadership, the bodies of the Cheka-KGB did extremely effective system, especially in extreme situations - during war years and aggravation of social tension. Thus, it was L. Beria, using the state security agencies, who mobilized the country’s enormous resources to create atomic weapons in the shortest possible time.

The Cheka-KGB system was truly a phenomenon. The thing is. that the KGB was a unique complex of intelligence services. The USSR State Security Committee included foreign intelligence (First Main Directorate), counterintelligence (Second Main Directorate), military counterintelligence (Third Main Directorate), transport and communications security (Fourth Directorate), economic counterintelligence (Sixth Directorate), ideological counterintelligence and political investigation (Department "3"), the fight against organized crime (Department for Combating Organized Crime), protection of the top leadership of the USSR and the CPSU (Security Service), border guards (Main Directorate of Border Troops), special troops (Main Directorate of Special Forces), ensuring government communications (Government Communications Department), encryption service (Eighth Main Directorate), decryption and radio interception service (Sixteenth Main Directorate), etc. The total number of KGB troops and agencies in 1991 reached about 420 thousand people.

This gigantic mechanism made it possible to quickly maneuver forces and concentrate them on the most important areas. this moment areas of work, reduce financial and material costs, avoid duplication. This structure of the KGB ensured the acquisition of important information from various sources, its effective cross-checking, comprehensive analysis and generalization, although, of course, it turned the committee to a large extent into a monopoly supplier the most important information for the leadership of the USSR. The absence of interdepartmental barriers between intelligence, counterintelligence and other services ensured the rapid coordination, development and successful implementation of complex long-term operations. This significantly increased the effectiveness of the KGB’s activities compared to the US intelligence services.

The activities of the KGB bodies were based on Marxist-Leninist ideology. Today, many view this circumstance solely as a negative one that contributed to the disappearance of this super-special service. However, we must remember that for many decades it was the communist ideology that was the strongest weapon of the Cheka-KGB. Most of the most valuable agents abroad began to work with the security officers for ideological reasons, sincerely believing in the messianic ideals of creating a just society and international peace. It is enough to name the third man of British intelligence, K. Philby, and O. Ames, the head of the sector of counterintelligence operations against the USSR of the CIA, recruited by the KGB in the mid-80s. And there were hundreds and thousands of such employees of foreign intelligence services, ministers, politicians, prominent diplomats and officials, officers and generals, professors and students who decided to fight against imperialism for social justice and linked their lives with the KGB. While traitors and defectors from among the employees of the USSR state security agencies, as a rule, made their choice because of other, far from ideological, considerations.

It is noteworthy that when, from the mid-70s, the system of party bodies, headed by the elderly Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, began to lose authority among the people, many ordinary people turned their gaze to the KGB. No wonder even ardent opponent Academician A. Sakharov considered this organization the least corrupt. And indeed, since 1975, the KGB received more letters with complaints, requests and proposals than the main power structure of the USSR - the CPSU Central Committee. Moreover, for the sake of fairness, it must be said that not a single one of these letters went unnoticed; many found their resolution. Work with workers' letters was constantly in the field of view of the Chairman of the KGB of the USSR Yu. Andropov, who created a special department responsible for this activity.

At the same time in last years The KGB, as a giant conglomerate of intelligence agencies, became increasingly difficult to manage. The Chairman of the KGB has practically become third in terms of his influence after the President (a.k.a. Secretary General Central Committee of the CPSU) and the Prime Minister of the USSR as a figure, and in terms of the amount of real power - the second person in the state.

It was not for nothing that KGB Chairman Yu. Andropov was able to quickly and effectively inherit the power of L. Brezhnev. It was in the KGB, earlier than in other government structures, that an understanding of the need for reform arose. And, of course, it must be said that the chief of state security, V. Kryuchkov, and his subordinates, more acutely than others, realized the terrible danger of the collapse of the USSR and the coming innumerable disasters for its peoples. That is why they took an active part in organizing the attempt to save the country in August 1991. However, it was too late: the process of disintegration of the CPSU, the entire power structure in the USSR, including the KGB, had gone too far.

The main principle of the activities of the Cheka-KGB bodies throughout their history was the principle of party leadership. These special services have never, under any circumstances, played an independent political role and have always been the obedient, sharpest tool of the CPSU. It was the connection of the KGB with the party structures of power that contributed to the growth of the power and influence of this special service, but, on the other hand, led the KGB to disintegration as it weakened, internally degraded and, finally, collapsed the CPSU and the Soviet Union.

The strong features of the KGB were the strict centralization and comprehensive nature of the structures of this special service, covering many areas of security, economy of forces and resources, lack of duplication of links, corporatism, elite personnel, direct integration into the system of the highest political and state leadership of the country, and hence a clear political and ideological orientation of activity.

In March 1954, operational units were separated from the Ministry of Internal Affairs. ensuring the state security of the country. On their basis, an independent department was established - the State Security Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR with the rights of a Union-Republican ministry. For the KGB bodies, a system of their construction, functioning, accountability and control was chosen that would in fact abolish their over-centralization and fit them into the constitutional system of government of the USSR to the maximum extent possible.

The very new name of the KGB bodies - the State Security Committee - clearly meant that the most important problems of their organization and activities should be resolved on a collegial basis. For these purposes, the KGB established a Collegium, which in its legal status differed significantly from the collegiums of other ministries and departments. If the collegiums of ministries were advisory bodies under the relevant ministers, then the KGB collegium was created as a decisive body. The provision on it provided that in those hypothetical cases when the KGB chairman finds himself in the minority during a vote, the issue under consideration should be automatically and immediately transferred to higher authorities. Such a procedure was envisaged as an effective guarantee and measure to prevent various kinds of voluntaristic tendencies in the KGB system. Collegial units (colleges and councils) were also created in local KGB bodies (up to and including the KGB departments of territories and regions).

The disadvantages of organizing the functioning of the State Security Committee include a strict relationship with the structures of the CPSU, a monopoly in the field of security in general and information support for the country's top leadership, the lack of real mechanisms of civilian control over the activities of the KGB, the complexity of managing this gigantic intelligence service and the inability to quickly transform depending on drastic changes. changes in the political and operational environment, lack of real competition. Main Intelligence Directorate General Staff The Armed Forces of the USSR, which occupied a specific niche and operated largely under the control of the KGB through military counterintelligence. Therefore, it would be wrong to consider the KGB and GRU as competitors.

Of course, some characteristic features, depending on the situation, can carry both a positive and a negative load, so the assessments given above can be considered to a certain extent subjective.

Perhaps something else is important: in general, the KGB as a special service, in its structure, functions, personnel composition and, most importantly, place in the system of state institutions, was extremely consistent with the mechanisms of state-political power in the Soviet Union. The degradation and collapse of this system inevitably led to the collapse of the KGB. This was the strategic vulnerability of the State Security Committee of the USSR - the most powerful intelligence service in the world, an analogue of which is unlikely to appear in the foreseeable future in the post-Soviet space. A strong state - the USSR - corresponded to a strong special service of the KGB, which died along with this state.

Cheka	(7) December 20, 1917 resolution of the Council of People's Commissars to combat counter-revolution and sabotage in Soviet Russia The All-Russian Extraordinary Commission (VChK) was formed. Its first chairman was appointed F.E. Dzerzhinsky He held this post until February 6, 1922. From July to August 1918 temporarily performed the duties of the Chairman of the Cheka I. Peters
GPU, OGPU	February 6, 1922 The All-Russian Central Executive Committee adopted a resolution on the abolition of the Cheka and the formation of the State Political Administration (GPU) under the NKVD of the RSFSR, and in November 1923. The Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR created the United State Political Administration (OGPU) under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. F.E. Dzerzhinsky remained the chairman of the GPU and OGPU until the end of his life (July 20, 1926), whom he replaced V.R. Menzhinsky , headed the OGPU until 1934.
NKVD	in July 1934 In accordance with the resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, state security bodies became part of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) of the USSR. After the death of Menzhinsky, the work of the OGPU, and later the NKVD from 1934 to 1936. led G.G. Berry From 1936 to 1938 NKVD headed N.I. Yezhov. From November 1938 to 1945 was the head of the NKVD L.P. Beria .
NKGB USSR	in February 1941 The NKVD of the USSR was divided into two independent bodies: the NKVD of the USSR and the People's Commissariat of State Security (NKGB) of the USSR. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs - L.P. Beria. People's Commissar of State Security - V.N. Merkulov . In July 1941 The NKGB of the USSR and the NKVD of the USSR were again united into a single People's Commissariat - the NKVD of the USSR. In April 1943 The People's Commissariat of State Security of the USSR was re-formed, headed by V.N. Merkulov.
MGB	in 1946 The NKGB was transformed into the Ministry of State Security. Minister - V.M. Chebrikov, from 1988 to August 1991 - V.A. Kryuchkov , from August to November 1991 - V.V. Bakatin . December 3, 1991 USSR President M.S. Gorbachev signed the Law "On the reorganization of state security bodies." On the basis of the Law, the KGB of the USSR was abolished and transition period on its basis, the Inter-Republican Security Service and the Central Intelligence Service of the USSR (currently the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation) were created.
SME	November 28, 1991 USSR President M.S. Gorbachev signed the Decree “On approval of the Temporary Regulations on the Inter-Republican Security Service.” Head - V.V. Bakatin (from November 1991 to December 1991).
KGB RSFSR	May 6, 1991 Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR B.N. Yeltsin and Chairman of the KGB of the USSR V.A. Kryuchkov signed a protocol on the formation in accordance with the decision of the Congress of People's Deputies of Russia of the State Security Committee of the RSFSR, which has the status of a union-republican state committee. V.V. Ivanenko was appointed its head.

In Russia, the MGB (Ministry of State Security) is created

Large-scale reform of the security and law enforcement agencies, which provides for the creation of a Ministry of State Security on the basis of the FSB, is being prepared in Russia. Kommersant writes about this on Monday, September 19, citing informed sources.

In addition to the FSB, the new structure is proposed to include the Federal Security Service and the Foreign Intelligence Service. The Investigative Committee, according to the plan, can be returned to the Prosecutor General's Office with a downgrade of the status of its main departments, and the functions of the Ministry of Emergency Situations are supposed to be distributed among the Ministry of Defense, to which it is planned to add troops civil defense, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, to which Gospozhnadzor may go.

The Investigation Department of the Ministry of State Security, according to the publication, will be able to deal with the most high-profile cases, as well as exercise procedural supervision over investigations initiated based on the department’s materials. In addition, the MGB will ensure its own security in all law enforcement and security agencies.

The reform is expected to be completed in time for the Russian presidential elections in 2018. By this time, according to sources, all heads of security and law enforcement agencies will be replaced, including the head of the Investigative Committee, Alexander Bastrykin. The latter, according to the newspaper, had already been made to understand that “in the new structure he can only count on an honorary position, but without managerial powers.”

Navalny screamed in his sleep, Zakharchenko thrashed about on his wet pillow, Kasyanov crawled out of bed, Yashin farted in fear.

I'm excited to create a new tag.

+ Media: The Ministry of Security will be created from the FSB, FSO and SVR

Before the 2018 presidential elections, it is planned to carry out a large-scale reform of security and law enforcement agencies in order to improve management efficiency and eradicate corruption; We are talking about the actual return of the FSB to the functions of the USSR State Security Committee, sources said.

According to Kommersant sources, preparations for the new reform began soon after the presidential decrees liquidated the FMS and FSKN, whose functions were given to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Russian Guard was created on the basis of the internal troops and a number of departments of the internal affairs bodies.

“If previously we (FSB operatives) only provided support for investigations, now we are tasked with monitoring their progress from the moment criminal cases are initiated until they are transferred to court.”

“If previously we (FSB operatives) only provided support for investigations, now we are tasked with monitoring their progress from the moment criminal cases are initiated until they are transferred to court.” Now we are talking about the actual return of the FSB to the functions of the USSR State Security Committee.
It is assumed that the new structure will receive the status of the Ministry of State Security (MGB). Moreover, it will include the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) and most units Federal service security (FSO). The current FSO will remain in the form of the Security Service of the President of Russia, which, in addition to security, will control special communications and transport services for senior officials.

In addition to structural changes, the new ministry will also receive new functions. For example, it is assumed that MGB officers will not only accompany and ensure investigations of criminal cases initiated based on their materials from the Investigative Committee and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but will also exercise procedural supervision over them.

As the publication notes, the main department of procedural control of the Investigative Committee, which performed these functions, has already been virtually liquidated. Moreover, the MGB will be responsible for ensuring its own security in all law enforcement and security agencies.

The investigative department of the MGB, which will receive the status of a central directorate, will be able to accept into its proceedings the most resonant and relevant national significance criminal cases, the jurisdiction of which is currently assigned in the Criminal Procedure Code to the Investigative Committee and the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

They say that a new investigation scheme is already being tested. For example, it was the FSB that opened a criminal case on organizing a criminal community against thief in law Zakhary Kalashov (Shakro Molodoy) and his associates, although the corresponding Art. 210 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation does not apply to its jurisdiction. At the same time, other departments are dealing with episodes of alleged crimes committed by the organized crime group.

The Main Investigation Department of the Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for Moscow is investigating two cases of extortion, in which members of the Shakro organized crime group are accused, and the Investigative Committee is looking into the shootout staged by the same defendants during the showdown on Rochdelskaya Street in Moscow, and the negligence of the police who did not intervene in it.

The FSB itself, which is leading the criminal prosecution of high-ranking employees of the Investigative Committee who allegedly received bribes from Shakro, actually exercises procedural control over all investigations as a whole.

“If previously we (FSB operatives) only provided support for investigations, now we are given the task of monitoring their progress from the moment criminal cases are initiated until they are transferred to court,” said an informed source in the FSB, who emphasized that we are talking about high-profile cases, including corruption-related ones. According to him, FSB officers will also check how effectively and fully the investigator used the information provided to him by the intelligence service. However, in what form such control will be exercised is not yet entirely clear.

As the publication notes, during the reform, serious changes may occur in the Investigative Committee of Russia. The Investigative Committee may again become a structure under the Russian Prosecutor's Office, from which it was separated in 2011. Accordingly, the status of its main departments will be lowered.

For example, the main military investigation department is supposed to be turned into a regular department. By the way, from January 1, 2017, the Main Military Prosecutor's Office of Russia will become a department of the Prosecutor General's Office. The corresponding law was adopted back in 2014 due to the fact that the military investigation and supervision over it will no longer be financed from the budgets of the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the FSB.

In turn, the Ministry of Defense can be strengthened by including civil defense troops, as well as rescue, fire and other emergency services of the Ministry of Emergency Situations. Gospozhnadzor, which was previously part of its structure, will go to the Ministry of Internal Affairs from the disbanded ministry.

It is expected that the reform of security and law enforcement agencies will be completed by the Russian presidential elections, which are scheduled to take place in 2018. However, for this it is still necessary to prepare the relevant bills and adopt them by the new parliament, and most importantly, find funds for this. Indeed, according to the most conservative estimates, tens of billions of rubles will be required just to pay compensation to employees of the reformed departments who do not want to serve in the new structures, the publication notes.

Also, according to the publication’s sources, in the process of the proposed reform it is planned to replace the current heads of services and departments. One of them is the creator of the Investigative Committee, Alexander Bastrykin, who was allegedly already “made to understand that in the new structure he can only count on an honorary position, but without managerial powers.”

Several departments at once unofficially confirmed to the publication that the issue of abolishing the rescue department and transferring its functions to other ministries is indeed being considered.

In particular, according to sources, we may be talking about transferring the “fire” component of the Ministry of Emergency Situations to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and rescue and emergency units to the Ministry of Defense.

Let us note that in August 2014, the 100th separate material support regiment was formed as part of the military department (located in Alabino, near Moscow). The main function of the formation, subordinate to Deputy Minister of Defense Dmitry Bulgakov, is the evacuation of the population, removal of rubble, work in areas of flooding or fires, and strengthening of troop groups anywhere in Russia. As the publication notes, participation in eliminating the consequences of emergencies is also included in the regulations on the Russian Guard.

Let us recall that in early April, President Vladimir Putin liquidated the State Drug Control Service and the Migration Service as independent federal departments, transferring them to the jurisdiction of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs.

In addition, on April 5, Putin announced the creation of the Russian Guard on the basis of the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The structure will deal with the fight against terrorism and organized crime.

In addition, on September 15, official representative of the Investigative Committee of Russia Vladimir Markin commented on the alleged imminent resignation Chairman of the Investigative Committee Alexander Bastrykin.

Let us also recall that on July 19, the Lefortovo Court of Moscow arrested the deputy head of the Main Investigative Directorate of the Investigative Committee for Moscow Denis Nikandrov, the deputy head of the internal security department of the Investigative Committee of Russia Alexander Lamonov, as well as the head of the internal security department of the Investigative Committee Mikhail Maksimenko in a bribery case. Later, the court extended Nikandrov’s arrest until December 19.

High-ranking employees of the Investigative Committee were detained due to possible involvement in the Shakro Molodoy case: allegedly for a large bribe, investigators promised to “resolve the issue” with the case against the thief in law.

A source in law enforcement also reported that employees of three departments of the Main Directorate of the Moscow Police received notices of dismissal.

Meanwhile, official representative of the department Vladimir Markin confirmed that a reorganization is being carried out in the Investigative Committee of Russia.

Earlier, the media reported that the Investigative Committee, under the leadership of the chairman of the department, Alexander Bastrykin, was undergoing large-scale reforms, during which the status of a number of main departments of the Investigative Committee was demoted to departments, and some of the departments became departments.

People's Commissariat of State Security (NKGB), was created by a resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party of Belarus of February 3, 1941.

It is noteworthy that this decision was made not by a government body, but by the Central Committee of a political party, which formally did not have any rights to do so: the “leading and directing role” of the CPSU appeared in the Constitution of the USSR only in 1977. Therefore, this decision was formally illegal. It is also interesting that the later Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the division of the NKVD into the NKVD and the NKGB was initially approved by this decree. That is, contrary to the Constitution of the USSR, the political party approved the decisions of the country's highest legislative body. Accordingly, the NKGB should have been guided not by the law and the Constitution, but by the decisions of the Central Committee of the party, which was outside the legal framework and not bound by any legislative norms. This predetermined the anti-legal nature of the activities of the NKGB.

According to this resolution, the creation of the NKGB was explained by the need for “maximum improvement of the intelligence and operational work of state security bodies and the increased volume of work of the NKVD of the USSR and its diversity.” The NKGB was assigned the following tasks:
– conducting intelligence work abroad;
– fight against subversive, espionage, terrorist activities foreign intelligence services inside the USSR;
– prompt development and disposal remnants of anti-Soviet parties and counter-revolutionary formations among various segments of the population of the USSR, in the system of industry, transport, communications, agriculture;
– protection of party and government leaders.

It is easy to see that only the first point, and, partially, the second, relates to the functions of ensuring state security. Partly because anyone could be accused of belonging to foreign intelligence services, saboteurs and terrorists, and the Central Committee resolution did not say what activities were considered “subversive”. Anything could be declared “subversive activity.”

Therefore, the main function of the NGKB was “the elimination of anti-Soviet parties and counter-revolutionary formations among various segments of the population.” What is considered a “counter-revolutionary formation”? We are not talking about partisan detachments (like, for example, Bandera), but about groups of citizens dissatisfied with the policies of the communists, not connected organizationally, and having only a common social status. It is no coincidence that we are talking about “strata of the population.” This formulation actually gives sanction for mass terror. He was appointed People's Commissar of the NKGB.

One of the reasons for the creation of the NKGB was the approach of war: the Sovietization of new territories and the elimination of “anti-Soviet elements” there were supposed. In addition, reconnaissance against potential opponents of the USSR acquired particular importance. But already in July 1941, the NKGB was again united with the NKVD into a single People's Commissariat: there were many two departments for waging war on their territory. The re-division occurred by the Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party of Belarus dated April 14, 1943. This Resolution approved the following structure of the NKGB:
– secretariat(combined the functions of managing its own security);
– 1st Directorate (Intelligence);
– 2nd Directorate (counterintelligence)(including intelligence work);
–3rd Directorate (Transport);
– 4th Directorate (sabotage). It existed long before the war, and many years after its end. It acted on the basis of decisions of the Politburo and Stalin personally. The USSR has always denied its involvement in terrorism;
– 5th Directorate (encryption-decryption);
– 6th Directorate (Security);
– Department of the Commandant of the Moscow Kremlin (Stalin's personal security);
– administrative, economic and financial management(The NKGB conducted an extensive economic activity, he owned many enterprises, mines, he was in charge of many construction projects);
– investigative unit for particularly important cases(espionage, and, most importantly, anti-Soviet activities);
– Department “A” (accounting and archiving);
– department “B” (use of operational equipment)(listening, surveillance);
– department “B” (correspondence readings)(this despite the fact that the secrecy of correspondence was guaranteed by law);
– Human Resources Department .

Created in November 1945 Department “K” – counterintelligence support for nuclear industry facilities. In January 1946, he was transferred from the NKVD to the NKGB department “C”: conducting reconnaissance on the atomic problem. Further reorganizations of the NKGB were carried out within the framework of a new department - the Ministry of State Security, created on March 15, 1946.

B.Z. became the first deputy people's commissar of the NKGB (for general issues). Kobulov. Later - S.I. Ogoltsov. The main role in the work of the NKGB was played by the promoters of L.P. Beria, which included both Merkulov and Kobulov. In particular, they were: S.A. Goglidze, V.G.Dekanozov, A.S.Blinov, E.P.Pitovranov, P.K.Sudoplatov, M.D.Ryumin, L.F.Tsanava, and some others.

The activities of the NKGB in February-July 1941 (a short period, as we see), were, however, “large-scale”: including the “liquidation of anti-Soviet elements” in the Baltic republics, the deportation of civilians from the western regions of the USSR on the eve of the war on socio-political grounds (together with the NKVD and according to intelligence data from the NKGB), executions of political prisoners in the first weeks of the war in the evacuated regions of the country. The NKGB was supposed to give the country's leadership information about plans and intentions Nazi Germany, but, having at his disposal quite voluminous information on this matter, the People's Commissar of the NKGB V.N. Merkulov reported to Stalin only what he wanted to hear. This was one of the reasons that the invasion of June 22, 1941 was a complete surprise for the USSR government.

In 1943-1945. Of particular importance in the work of the NKGB is reconnaissance and sabotage activities in the rear of German troops, and many NKGB employees honestly fulfilled their military duty: they fought against the fascist occupiers. But there was something else: provoking the Germans to repress the civilian population, arbitrary killings of persons suspected of collaborating with the occupiers (often based on false denunciations; besides, even chopping wood in a soldier’s kitchen could be called “collaboration”), “policemen” (in People served in the police for a variety of reasons – including under duress). They killed those suspected of having links with the Gestapo (very often without any reason). The NKGB, with the help of its special detachments, fought against national formations: the Home Army, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Latvian and Estonian SS legionnaires, and the Lithuanian “Forest Brothers”. For these purposes, provocations were widely used, up to the creation of false rebel detachments, which, allegedly on behalf of the same “Banderaites,” attacked the population, robbed and killed. Criminal elements were often involved in such detachments (criminals were promised amnesty after the war).

As we moved west, the importance of “work” in the countries of Eastern Europe increased, where the NKGB was also engaged in the “liquidation of anti-Soviet elements.” Under the newly formed state security bodies of the Eastern European communist regimes, groups of NKGB advisers were created, whose instructions, as a rule, were of a mandatory nature, and oriented them towards harsh repressions against all opposition forces, even potential ones. NKGB officers in Poland, Hungary, Germany and other countries where the Soviet Army entered carried out arbitrary arrests and executions; citizens of foreign countries were expelled to Siberia without any legal grounds, often without trial and without explanation. The NKGB was also involved in the “seizure” of enormous valuables from private individuals in Germany and a number of other countries (under the guise of “reparations,” the Soviet administration often carried out banal robbery; the NKGB officers also “did not forget” themselves).

In 1944-1946. NKGB military units conducted combat operations in Western Ukraine, Western Belarus, Lithuania and Latvia against local anti-communist formations. The regular army was involved in these operations, and it was the NKGB that determined the tactics and strategy of this struggle, including mass deportations. Many of the NKGB's operations in these territories can be classified as war crimes. In particular, we are talking about provoking ethnic clashes in the Kholm region between Poles and Ukrainians in 1944-1945, about reprisals against former soldiers and officers of Vlasov’s army in 1945, about reprisals against the civilian population of East Prussia in 1945-1946. , and so on.

The number of NKGB bodies as of March 1946 was 137,672 people, including 22,000 people. “secret staff” - employees who officially have another place of work and maintain contact with agents. Thus, if we assume that each “secret employee” had “only” 10 informants “in touch,” then even then we will get almost a quarter of a million “informers.” Of course, there were many more.

Being focused on establishing the power of communists in the “liberated” territories, on the use of illegal methods, the NKGB could not in any significant way contribute to the protection state interests THE USSR. The secret of the atomic bomb was obtained by another department - the NKVD, where, on the initiative of Beria, a special department was created that was engaged in collecting intelligence information on atomic and general scientific and technical topics. And real German spies and saboteurs were identified, as a rule, by the military counterintelligence SMERSH - a structure subordinate not to the NKGB, but to the army. From the very beginning, the NKGB was only an instrument of political terror in the hands of the party.

Ivanov V.A. The mechanism of mass repressions in Soviet Russia in the late 20s-40s. M., 1998.

Khlobustov O. The birth of domestic counterintelligence. M., 2008.

Vinarov I. Soldiers of the Quiet Front. Sofia. 1987.

Agabekov G. Secret terror. M., 1996.

Tsarev O., Costello D. Fatal illusions. From the archives of the KGB.M., 1995.

Petrov I., Skorkin K. Who led the NKVD. 1934-1941. M., 1999.

Essays on the history of Russian foreign intelligence. At 6t. T.4. M., 1999.

Kokurin A.I., Petrov I.V. Lubyanka. Bodies of the Cheka-OGPU-NKVD-KGB. 1917-1991. M., 2004.

Antonov V., Karpov V. Secret informants of the Kremlin. M., 2000.

Khlobustov O. State security under attack. From the notes of a professional. M., 2009.

Vladimir Georgievich Dekanozov worked for a long time with Beria in Transcaucasia, where he was involved in mass repressions in Azerbaijan and Armenia. At the end of the 30s, he was the USSR Ambassador to Germany, while being operationally subordinate to the NKGB, and led the Soviet intelligence network in Germany. After the war - in the ministry foreign trade, then again in the state security agencies. Shot on December 23, 1953, as an “accomplice of Beria.” Currently, the Supreme Court of Russia has recognized Dekanozov’s death sentence as inappropriate for the acts he actually committed and replaced it with 20 years in prison.

Yevgeny Pitovranov is one of the most prominent Soviet intelligence officers, the creator of a powerful intelligence network in the United States. Author of memoirs. He escaped repression.

Pavel Sudoplatov headed the sabotage department of the NKGB for a long time. Participant in the Spanish Civil War, where he also carried out terrorist attacks, including those that led to death civilians. Previously he was involved in the murder of L.D. Trotsky. Organizer of the murder of S. Bandera and a number of other emigration figures in the post-war period. He prepared the assassination of Yugoslav leader Joseph Broz Tito. It was Sudoplatov who held the “leadership” in the use of explosives using destructive elements (nails, bolts, glass), as well as in the invention of the “suicide bomber belt”. Author of memoirs.

Mikhail Dmitrievich Ryumin is the organizer of the “Doctors’ Case,” which he led the investigation into and which he sought to inflate. He used torture and psychological pressure during interrogations. In 1953, after Stalin's death, he was arrested, in 1954 he was convicted and executed. Not rehabilitated.

Lavrenty Tsanava in 1938-1952 headed the state security agencies in Belarus, is directly responsible for mass repressions in the BSSR. Shot. Not rehabilitated.

Paporov Yu. On the trail of Trotsky’s ghost. LG-archive. 1994. issue No. 7.

Kolpakidi A., Prokhorov D. Special operations of Soviet intelligence. M., 2000.

Stetsovsky Yu. I. History of Soviet repressions. T.2. M., 1998.

Collection of legislative and regulatory acts on repression and rehabilitation of victims political repression. M., 1993.

Degtyarev K. SMERSH. M., 2009.

The Black Book of Communism. Collection of documents. M., 2002.

Kolpakidi A., Sever A. KGB. M., 2010.