One of the most important (at least for Russia) battles of the Great Northern War, the Battle of Lesnaya, took place on September 28, 1708 in the Mogilev region. As a result of the confrontation, the corvolant of Peter the Great defeated the Swedish corps of General Levengaupt. According to Peter I, this victory became “the mother of the Poltava victory.” Today we will talk about the Battle of Lesnaya, briefly discuss its background, course and consequences.

Background

In 1708, Charles XII ordered the infantry general A.L. Levengaupt to gather troops from the garrisons of Courland and Livonia and unite with the king’s army, preparing for the invasion of Russian lands. On September 22, 1708, the general’s detachment, consisting of 12-16 thousand people, headed towards Propoisk.

Meanwhile, Charles the Seventh, after the cavalry battle at Raevka, decided to abandon the campaign against Smolensk and turned to Ukraine. There were at least three objective reasons for this. Firstly, the Swedish army was in dire need of replenishing supplies of provisions and fodder. Secondly, there were not strong enough military garrisons in Ukraine, which means that the army of Charles XII could rest there calmly and wait for Levenhaupt’s troops. And thirdly - Charles XII hoped to enlist the support of the Cossacks - Hetman Mazepa promised him to bring up to 20 thousand soldiers. In addition, the king hoped to establish contact with the Crimean Khan and the Poles.

Due to his deviation to the south, Charles XII moved away from Levenhaupt's corps, and Peter the Great decided not to miss the opportunity to give him battle. Peter I sent key forces of the Russian army under the leadership of Field Marshal Sheremetev to pursue the Swedish army of the king. Believing that Levengaupt’s detachment consisted of approximately 8 thousand people, the tsar sent Menshikov’s 7,000-strong corvolant to meet him, which he later led personally.

The false guide deceived the king by pointing him in the wrong direction of the enemy's movement, as a result of which Peter the Great moved with his army to the Dnieper. He soon learned that Levengaupt would melt down his detachment at Shklov and head to Propoisk. The entire cavalry was sent in pursuit of the Swedish general. To speed up the movement, the infantry was mounted on horses. On September 25, the Russian army overtook Levengaupt's troops. The next day, the Swedish general sent a convoy ahead and repelled the Russian attack. He then went across the Resta River, where he stayed until the night of September 27. After this, Swedish troops concentrated near the village of Lesnaya. Meanwhile, part of the convoy (3,000 soldiers) was sent to Propoisk.

Only when confronted with the enemy did Peter the Great realize that he had greatly underestimated their numbers. On September 26, at the military council, it was decided to call for help the corps of Lieutenant General Baur, consisting of 4 thousand cavalrymen, and wait for him for two days. After the specified period, the Russian army had to attack the enemy with available forces. At the same time, 700 dragoons from Fastman’s brigade were sent to destroy the crossing over the Sozh River (Propoisk area). And Major General von Werden, who at that time was stationed near Smolensk, received an order to meet General Levenhaupt’s convoy, but did not have time to take part in the battle.

In different sources you can find at least two dates for this historical event. The reason for this is simple: some of them use the Gregorian calendar (new style), while others use the Julian calendar (old style). The date of the battle near the village of Lesnoy according to the new style (it is the one used in this article) is September 28, 1078, and according to the old style - October 9.

Concentration of troops

On September 28, 1078, Levengaupt’s detachment was preparing to cross the Lesnyanka River. Realizing that the Russian corps was standing nearby, the Swedes took up high-altitude positions near the village: 6 battalions took the forward position, and all the rest took the main position, with their rear to the river. According to Levenhaupt's plan, the Russian attack was to be repulsed before the convoy was transported. Together with Levenhaupt, Major General of Cavalry Schlippenbach and Major General of Infantry Stackelberg were responsible for command.

Corvolant moved towards the battlefield along forest roads, breaking into two columns. The first of them was headed by A.D. Menshikov, and the second was headed by Peter the Great. So that the Russian regiments could leave the forest and line up for the attack, Colonel Campbell’s Nevsky Regiment, which entered the battlefield first, was forced to attack the enemy outright. As a result, his cavalry suffered heavy losses (56% of the soldiers were killed or wounded). On the other hand, the horse formation was the most successful option for attacking the Swedes, who were not ready to repel the attack. The Swedes should be given their due, as they managed to form a square and still repulse the attack.

Major General Golitsyn's guard soon moved to help Campbell's regiment, thanks to which the Swedes lost their advanced positions and retreated to the main line. So the Russian corvolant entered the open field and began to form just a kilometer from the enemy.

Composition of the Russian army

In the center stood Golitsyn's guards brigade, which included Semenovsky, Preobrazhensky and 2 Ingermanland battalions. The right flank consisted of the cavalry of Major General Schaumburg, the general leadership of which was entrusted to the Lieutenant General Prince of Hesse-Darmstadt. The left flank was made up of the cavalry of Lieutenant General Flug and Major General Boehm, under the overall command of Lieutenant General Bruce of the artillery.

On the second line there were 6 dragoon regiments, which were reinforced by battalions of the Ingermanland and Astrakhan regiments. The grenadiers of the guard regiments and the dragoon regiment from Rostov, which the Swedes mistook for the third line, were responsible for the rigidity of the formation. In total, the number of Russian troops was about 10 thousand people. There were about a thousand fewer Swedes.

Start of the battle

The battle near the village of Lesnoy took place on September 28, 1708 and lasted approximately 6 hours (from 13 to 19), with short breaks. The Russians attacked the enemy several times. Basically, the attack began with shooting and ended with hand-to-hand combat. By the middle of the battle, the opponents were so tired that they fell exhausted to the ground, at a distance of 200-300 meters from each other, and rested for several hours right on the battlefield. Both sides allowed themselves such pauses for a reason: the Russians were waiting for reinforcements in the form of Baur's detachment, and the Swedes - in the person of their vanguard.

Reinforcement

By 17 o'clock, 4 thousand dragoons of General Baur arrived on the battlefield. The Russians again attacked the Swedes and drove them to the village itself, where the enemy’s convoy was stationed. General Baur's cavalry, meanwhile, outflanked the Swedes and recaptured the bridge across the Lesnyanka River, cutting off the enemy's path to retreat. The Swedes had to use the village for defense and build a fortified camp from wagons. When reinforcements arrived to Levengaupt's troops, they managed to recapture the bridge from the Russians. By seven o'clock in the evening it began to get dark, the weather began to deteriorate - it began to rain and snow. Active Russian attacks stopped, so it is believed that the main battle near the village of Lesnoy ended at that moment. Nevertheless, the artillery continued to fire at the Swedes’ camp, who continually struck back. The artillery duel lasted until 10 p.m. Ultimately, Levenhaupt decided to retreat.

Swedes retreat

Levenhaupt understood that his army would not be able to break away from pursuit with heavy carts. Therefore, when the Swedes began to retreat at night, they left half of the convoy (about 3 thousand carts), artillery and the wounded. To deceive the enemy, they lit fires in the camp, supposedly for an overnight stay, and they themselves suddenly headed across the Lesnyanka River. Many of the Swedish soldiers deserted.

The pursuit

Peter the Great learned about the flight of the Swedes only the next morning. He sent a detachment of Lieutenant General Flug in pursuit. Flug's army caught up with the enemy near Propoisk, where the Russians had already managed to destroy the crossing. As a result, Levengaupt had to abandon the second half of the convoy (about 4 thousand carts) and cross the Sozh River, not far from the village of Glinka. The extent of the damage suffered by the Swedes during their retreat was due to the disorder and negligence on the part of the soldiers - they even allowed themselves to abuse wine during the flight. The remnants of the Swedish corps were forced to flee on an accelerated march to the main forces of Charles XII, taking with them only personal weapons.

Losses

According to Russian data, during the battle near the village of Lesnaya, approximately 8 thousand Swedish soldiers were killed. About a thousand more Swedes were captured. In addition, the Russians captured a huge convoy, which amounted to a three-month supply of food and ammunition for the army of Charles the Seventh.

The Russian army in the battle near the village of Lesnoy lost a total of about four thousand people. Of the famous commanders, Lieutenant General Prince of Hesse-Darmstadt was mortally wounded, and Lieutenant General R.H. Brown was seriously wounded. Right on the battlefield, his arm and leg were paralyzed. Brown remained unconscious until the end of September. For several months the Russian army was left without its bravest and most active commander. By the battle of Poltava, he had fully recovered and again proved his military prowess, heroism and stewardship. While the lieutenant general was being treated, his division was at the disposal of Prince Menshikov.

Superiority of troops

According to Peter the Great, the victory in the Battle of Lesnaya in 1708 became “the mother of the Poltava victory.” The army of Charles the Seventh lost reserves, ammunition and was significantly weakened. It is important to understand that at all stages of the battle, the number of royal troops was not inferior to the number of troops of the Swedish king. At the first stage of the confrontation, 12.5 thousand Corvolant fighters, along with several thousand Kalmyk-Cossack cavalry, confronted the 8 thousand-strong Swedish army. At the next stage of the battle, the Swedes received reinforcements of 3 thousand people who returned from Propoisk, which, taking into account losses, increased their strength to 9-10 thousand. However, in parallel with this, the troops of the Russian sovereign were constantly increasing at the expense of parts of Baur’s corps and the main forces of the Kalmyks and Cossacks.

In addition, the Russians had a qualitative superiority. The fact is that the troops of the “Baltic Army” did not have a single guards or simply elite Swedish regiment. The lion's share of the regiments was staffed not by Swedes, but by Livonian Germans, Finns, Karelians of Swedish Finland, Estonians of the Baltic states, Slavs, Izhorians of Swedish Ingermanland, immigrants from Poland and mercenaries from Germany. Peter the Great, meanwhile, included the best guards infantry and dragoon regiments in his “Flying Corps”.

The Russians coped with such a strategic task as intercepting a supply train as well as possible. Of the 8 thousand Swedish carts, approximately 3 thousand were left near Lesnaya, and 4 thousand were abandoned at Propoisk. In addition, the lion's share of the remaining supplies was abandoned by the Swedes during the retreat. After the arrival of the remnants of the “Baltic Army”, the main Swedish forces were forced to radically change their strategy.

Strategic mistakes of Peter I

During the battle near the village of Lesnoy in 1708, the Russian command made a serious mistake - it included a small amount of artillery in the corvolant. The Baur artillery park simply did not have time to approach the battle site in time, as did the infantry from the same corps. Because of this, the battle turned out to be longer and more brutal for the Russian army, and the Swedish army was able to relatively successfully retreat to the Wagenburg (a mobile fortification made from wagons) and gain a foothold in it. Without strong artillery, the Russian army did not dare to attack the Swedish Wagenburg, which allowed Levenhaupt to withdraw part of the troops to the main forces of the king.

At the same time, despite the significant disparity of forces, Russian troops were never able to fully encircle and destroy the enemy. Here it is worth paying tribute to General Levengaupt, who was able to break through the encirclement and lead part of the army to join the main forces of Charles the Seventh. Thanks to the most important event of the Northern War - the battle near the village of Lesnoy - Levengaupt, despite the defeat, managed to win the favor of his commander-in-chief.

Awards

For his distinction in the battle near the village of Lesnoy, M. M. Golitsyn was elevated to the rank of lieutenant general. The Kadashevsky Mint in Moscow minted 4,618 silver medals, which were distributed to lower ranks. The diameter of the medals was 28 millimeters. Officers participating in the battle, depending on their rank, were awarded 6 types of gold medals, in denominations of 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, or 13 chervonets. A total of 1,140 such awards were issued.

Memory

In honor of the 200th anniversary of the battle near the village of Lesnoy, a monument was erected in this locality in the form of a bronze eagle that defeated the enemy’s banner. Not far from the monument, the St. Peter and Paul Church was erected, which housed a battle museum during Soviet times. At the beginning of the 1990s, the battle near the village of Lesnoy was again respected by building a new temple not far from the site of hostilities. And in honor of the tercentenary of the battle, a new museum was opened near it, the exhibition of which included banners, coins, weapons, photocopies of documents, as well as a mini-panorama of the battle. At the local cemetery there is a mass grave of soldiers who fell during the battle, on which there is a marble obelisk in the form of a stele with memorable words.

Charles XII's campaign in Russia was the culmination of the Northern War. After waiting for the rivers and swamps to freeze, the 45,000-strong Swedish army, led by the invincible king, at the beginning of 1708 moved across the territory of Belarus to Moscow. A third of the Swedish armed forces took part in this operation (and in fact, with the Livonian and Finnish corps of Levengaupt and Lübecker - half).
In this situation, Peter I could only defend himself. According to the plan drawn up by the tsar, the Russian army in Belarus was supposed to avoid decisive battles. She was instructed to retreat and wear down the Swedes in defensive battles, thereby creating the conditions for the subsequent transition to a counteroffensive. The Russian regiments retreated, destroying roads and bridges, destroying all supplies. Remaining an elusive shadow, Russian troops intercepted lagging enemy soldiers and officers, destroyed foraging detachments, and attacked isolated enemy units.

The Swedes were not ready for such a turn of events. Their king, trying to increase the mobility of his army, usually did not care about organizing the rear and preferred to supply the army from local resources. Under the Russian “strategy of attrition,” this flaw in Charles XII’s tactics made itself felt fully. The famous historian Sergei Solovyov wrote about all this like this: “The campaign was difficult for a hungry army in a devastated country; the soldiers themselves had to remove the ears of corn from the field and grind them between stones, and here it was still raining continuously and there was nowhere to dry. This was a necessary consequence of the dampness and bad food - illness; the soldiers said that they had three doctors: Doctor Vodka, Doctor Garlic and Doctor Death."
Finding himself in a two-hundred-kilometer zone of “man-made desert,” Charles XII suspended the offensive and gave the order to the general’s Liflyad corps (16 thousand people) to urgently go to Belarus to join the main army to replenish supplies of food and ammunition. Leventhaupt gathered a huge convoy of more than 7 thousand carts and moved to the aid of his king. The number of carts in the convoy - 7,000 - is a very controversial figure. The fact is that the convoy consisted of regimental convoys, carts of sutlers (i.e. private individuals) and vans with supplies for the royal army, assembled in Courland. So there were 1,300 of the latter (by order of the king, each company of the Courland Army, and there were 128 of them, had to prepare and bring with them 10 wagons with supplies. Regimental convoys could consist of 1,700 wagons, including personal officers. Thus, the convoy could consist out of 3,000 combat wagons. The number of sutlers' wagons is not known, but it may have been significant. Levenhaupt was greatly delayed and set out on short marches only at the end of May. In a month he barely covered 230 kilometers.

Meanwhile, on July 7, Charles reached the Dnieper and occupied the city of Mogilev without a fight. Let us remind you once again that so far all actions still took place on the territory of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The Swedish army set out from Mogilev on August 5, without waiting for Levenhaupt, the delay lasted for a very long time, it was time to resume military operations. However, the Swedish troops did not move against the main forces of the Russians, who stood in fortified positions near Gorki, but turned to the southeast and ran into the Sozh River (a tributary of the Dnieper). The Swedes were forced to stay close to the Dnieper in order to somehow shield Levengaupt’s small corps. They tried to lure the Russians out of their positions and force open battle on them.
At Cherikov, not far from the Sozh River, the Swedes stood for a couple of days, exchanging fire with the Russians on the other side of the river. Karl, a great lover of shooting, walked excitedly along the shore and took a musket from one soldier or another. He shot several Russians with his own hands.

Only a few minor skirmishes took place, for example, at Dobroy on August 31 and at Raevka on September 10, but in general, they did not lead to any result other than minor losses. The hunt for the retreating Russian troops continued in the direction of the northeast, towards Smolensk. On September 11, the Swedish army stopped at Starishi, a border town located on both sides of the high road to Moscow. From here there were only 14 miles left to Smolensk.

For four days Karl remained indecisive. By order of Peter, the Russians ravaged their own country in the same way as Poland. In order not to be unfounded, we will quote from Peter’s decree: “If the enemy goes to Ukraine, then go in front of him and everywhere, provisions and fodder, as well as standing grain in the field and in threshing floors or in granaries in the villages (except only in cities).. . burn the Polish and your own, without sparing, and the buildings in front of it and on the sides, also spoil the bridges, cut down the forests and keep them at large crossings if possible.” Severe punishment awaited the violators: “say everywhere, if anyone brings anything to the enemy, even for money, he will be hanged, and so will the one who knows and does not tell.”

In another decree, the tsar ordered that the grain exported to Smolensk not be “hidden in pits,” but that “the mills, millstones, and gear should all be taken out and buried in the ground, or drowned somewhere in deep water, or broken,” so that “the enemy would not get it for grinding.” of bread". Lieutenant General Bour received a similar order from Peter: “to tire the main army with burning and ruin.”
After some thought, Karl gave the order to march to Ukraine. On September 15, the army turned south and moved towards the city of Starodub.

The day before (September 14), Peter convened a military council, at which it was decided to divide the army. Most of the army, led by Field Marshal Sheremetev, was ordered to follow Karl to Ukraine, and a 10,000-strong corps (corvolant) with 30 regimental guns was ordered to move towards Levengaupt. Menshikov was assigned to command the corvolant, but in fact it was commanded by Peter himself.

Meanwhile, Levengaupt's corps was moving in the direction Shklov - Propoisk. Levenhaupt knew nothing that Karl had changed his plan of action and continued to move towards the crossing of the Dnieper near Shklov. On September 21, the 16,000-strong Swedish corps with 16 guns and a huge convoy crossed the Dnieper and continued to move towards Propoisk. He was pursued by a 12,000-strong cavalry corps (corvolant) consisting of 10 dragoon and 3 infantry regiments mounted on horses. At the same time, a 4,000-strong cavalry detachment of the general moved from Krichev to cross Levengaupt. 12 versts from Propoisk near the village of Lesnaya, a Russian corvolant overtook Levengaupt.
To begin with, Levengaupt did not want to give battle on the field at Lesnaya, he was inclined to the field at Propoisk, where he could involve the entire Courland army. His quartermaster general, Brask, convinced him to fight a rearguard action. The position was far from perfect. Wagenburg, as such, was not built; on the outskirts of the village, regimental convoys stood in groups, depending on where the regiments spent the night. The bridge over Lesnyanka was not protected and was only covered by part of the artillery. The Swedes, like the Russians, did not know the exact number of the enemy, although they suspected that the forces were significant, since they were led by the tsar himself (they learned this from prisoners).

In the morning, on the day of the battle, the Swedes sent part of the convoys to Propoisk (including 1300 with royal supplies) and, when sending transport, carefully monitored the strictly permitted number of officer carts, which were allowed to be left to the officers: colonels - 4 each, lieutenant colonels and majors - 3 each, captains and captains - 2 each, lieutenants and warrant officers 1 each. The rest were to be destroyed on the spot.

2824 people were dispatched to Propoisk to escort transport from 1300 carts with supplies for the king. combat units (3 infantry battalions, 1 cavalry regiment, 1 dragoon regiment and 2 dragoon squadrons), in addition, the drivers on these vans were soldiers (another 1300 people), and from each regiment there were 100 guards (another 1600 people)
Thus, up to half of the Courland army was at Propoisk at the beginning of the battle.

The position chosen by Levenhaupt for the battle was a clearing surrounded by forest. Here the Swedish troops settled down, setting up a fortified camp behind them, covering the road to Propoisk. To the north of this clearing there was another clearing, which Levenhaupt decided to occupy with six battalions of infantry. This forward position was convenient in that it was covered from the left flank by the Lesnyanka River, and from the right by a dense forest, which made it difficult for Russian troops to escape from it.
Having crossed the Resta River, Russian troops approached the Swedes. Peter divided the corvolant into two columns. At the head of the left column (one infantry and seven dragoon regiments) was Menshikov, the right column (two infantry, three dragoon regiments and one battalion) was commanded by Peter himself. There were 5-6 thousand people in each column. For speed of movement, the infantry that was part of the columns (Ingermanland, Preobrazhensky, Semenovsky and Astrakhan regiments) were also mounted on horses.

The battle began at 8 am on September 27 (October 9). Russian artillery opened fire from a forest located near the village and forced the Swedish regiments to retreat. However, when the right-flank column, the vanguard, which consisted of the Nevsky Dragoon and Ingermanland infantry regiments, began to line up at the edge of the forest to attack, the Swedes counterattacked and captured four cannons
. By 11 o'clock Levengaupt managed to push Peter's right flank to the forest. “If it weren’t for the forests,” the tsar later wrote, “then they would have won, since there were 6 thousand of them more than us.” Hiding in the thickets, the Russian infantry broke away from the Swedes and freely retreated to a safe place, where they formed up again and put themselves in order. By this time, Menshikov’s left column, which had not arrived in time for its start, had arrived at the battle site.
In the afternoon there followed a new powerful attack by 12 dragoon regiments and 12 Russian infantry battalions. During the battle, 1377 returned to the field. Swedes (1 battalion infantry, 1 cavalry regiment and 1 drag squadron from the Swedish vanguard, initially sent to Propoisk. But the Russians began to press the Swedes and by 3 o’clock in the afternoon they were pressed against the carts. Behind Levengaupt there was a village and a river. It seemed that there was a village and a river behind him. , one more pressure - and the Swedish defense would collapse. But at this climax, the unexpected happened. The intensity of the battle turned out to be so high that the opponents, without saying a word, suddenly fell to the ground from fatigue and rested for a couple of hours right on the battlefield...
The unexpected respite turned out to be beneficial for both sides. By 5 o'clock in the afternoon, Bour's detachment arrived in time for the Russians, and the Swedes received second reinforcements - 2 infantry battalions, 1 dragoon regiment and 1 drag. squadron - total 1429 people..
With the approach of Bour's cavalry, Peter immediately resumed the battle. The Tsar placed the arriving reinforcements on his right flank in order to break through to the river with a powerful blow from here, capture the bridge across Lesnyanka and cut off the Swedes’ path to retreat.
In a “great fierce battle”, which after the first volleys turned into a merciless hand-to-hand fight, the Russians managed to capture the bridge over Lesnyanka. The path to Propoisk was closed for Levengaupt. But then the 3,000-strong Swedish detachment, which had returned to its own, intervened in the matter. He immediately entered the fray and managed to recapture the crossing.
After this success, the Swedes took refuge behind the carts. It was dusk. It began to rain with wind and snow. The Russian attackers ran out of ammunition. By 7 pm the darkness deepened, the snowfall intensified and the battle died down. But the gun duel continued until 10 pm. The Russians spent the night in position, preparing for a new attack. Peter I was also there with his troops, despite the bad weather.
The Swedes defended the village and the crossing, but the position of their corps was extremely difficult. Not hoping for a successful outcome of the battle, Levenhaupt decided to retreat. Considering that the general had not lost a single battle before Lesnoy, one can imagine what such a step cost him.
In the morning, Peter was going to resume the attack, but Levenhaupt secretly took the army to Propoisk, mounting the infantry on baggage horses. At the site of the camp before leaving, he lit bivouac fires from the supply wagons that had become unnecessary, so that the enemy would think that the Swedish army had spent the night in Lesnaya. The persecution began only in the morning. The Russian dragoons of General Pflug arrived in Propoisk on September 29, where they captured the remains of the Swedish convoy. Levenhaupt, unable to take away the artillery, drowned the cannons in the swamp, and the gunpowder and charges in the Sozh River. With the remnants of demoralized troops, Levengaupt fled down the Sozh River.
On October 12, the remnants of Levenhaupt's corps, numbering about 6,500 people, united with Charles's army. The king was extremely upset, but he not only did not punish Levenhaupt, but, on the contrary, sent a bulletin to Stockholm, where on six pages it was told how the Swedes bravely repelled the attack of 40 thousand Muscovites all day and how the barbarians retreated in the evening. Not a word was said about the loss of the convoy.

The figures show that the Russians had numerical superiority throughout the entire battle of Lesnaya: 17,917 people (5149 infantry, 7792 dragoons for Peter I and 4076 dragoons for General Boura) and 30 guns against 12,900 Swedes (8000 infantry, 2000 cavalry and 2900 dragoon) with 16 guns.
The figure of 16,000, wandering around in historical literature, meant the staffing strength of the Courland Army, General. Levenhaupt. 2957 people (1 drag squadron and 6 battalion infantry) were left in Riga. Moreover, Levenhaupt himself in his memoirs gives an even smaller number of troops participating in the battle - 10,914 people.

According to Russian sources, the Swedes' losses in killed alone amounted to 8,000 people - "8,000 were laid to rest" (Journal of Peter the Great). In fact, the Swedes, out of 12,900 people, remained in the ranks after the battle with 3,541 infantrymen, 1,303 cavalrymen and 1,749 dragoons, a total of 6,503 people. Losses amounted to 6397 people. Over 1000 people returned to Riga, from which 2 garrison regiments were later formed. 2,673 Swedes (including abandoned wounded) were taken prisoners, including 45 officers. So the irretrievable battle losses amounted to 2,724 people, this includes the losses of the Swedes when they were pursued by the Cossacks and Kalmyks (including killed drunken soldiers and those who fell asleep after the battle) and missing persons.
In this battle, the Russians lost 1,111 people killed and 2,856 wounded. So in the battle itself, the Swedes’ losses were not much greater than the Russians.
After the Forest, the army of Charles XII lost significant material resources and was cut off from its bases in the Baltic states. The success at Lesnaya raised the morale of the Russian troops. Peter I called her “the mother of the Poltava battle,” and ordered the participants in the battle to be awarded a specially embossed medal with the inscription “To the worthy, worthy.” After the Forest Tsar forgave Prince Repnin and returned him the rank of general.

FROM PRINCE KURAKIN'S NOTES

And upon the departure of Field Marshal Sheremetev to Ukraine, His Majesty, taking his guard and that division, cavalry infantry and cavalry of the 16th regiment under the command of Prince Menshikov, went to Lithuania, near Lesnoye, to meet the enemy general Levengopt, who went at 16,000 and had quite a lot with him ammunition, provisions, and artillery; which at that place near Lesno was defeated, and 16 artillery cannons, and all the armor was taken, and all the equipment was lost, only the cavalry of 5 or six regiments was withdrawn at a run and united with the King of Sweden.

PROGRESS OF MILITARY OPERATION

Levenhaupt sought to pass through these forest thickets and swampy coppices, dangerous for his colossal, cumbersome convoy, and get out to Propoisk, from where he could go straight to the king.

On the night of September 27-28, the vanguard of Peter the Great's "corvolant" attacked the Swedes, located in a clearing near the village of Lesnoy. The combatants were surrounded on all sides by forests. The Russian attack on the 27th was repulsed.

The initial hours of the battle on September 28 were not successful for the Russians, because due to terrain conditions they brought only one part of their vanguard into battle. Another unit arrived in time and drove the Swedes back. But this was only the beginning of the matter and took the morning hours. The clashes proceeded with intermittent success. In the afternoon the battle unfolded in full force. The Russian army, with eight infantry battalions and four dragoon cavalry regiments in front, moved towards the enemy. Behind this first line came a strong cavalry—six in the second line, and behind it two more regiments of dragoons. But this second line was also supported by infantry, although almost half in number than that which was supposed to withstand the first clash.

Levengaupt was subsequently reproached for having weakened his forces even before the battle by sending a large group of infantry and cavalry to accompany and guard the convoy he was transporting to the king. But Levenhaupt could not do otherwise: after all, for him the very existence of such a large Peter the Great’s “corvolant”, specifically directed against him, which he could consider the vanguard of the entire Russian army, was a complete surprise. The presence of the king himself was also significant. Levenhaupt learned about all this only on the way […] and with most of his army decided to detain the Russians at Lesnaya. Until about noon on September 28, he succeeded. But the Russians eventually drove the Swedes out of the forest and did not allow Levenhaupt to complete the attempt he had begun to envelop the Russian left flank. Seeing that the situation was more dangerous than it seemed, Levengaupt ordered that group of his troops that was escorting the convoy to Propoisk to return hastily and immediately take part in the battle. But if the Swedes waited and waited for the return (halfway) of this vanguard of theirs, then the Russians also waited and also waited for the Swedes to receive absolutely unexpected and much more significant support: like other great commanders, as, for example, Napoleon subsequently did on all important occasions, Peter, preparing for the decisive battle, pulled literally all the military formations that he could pull to the main point and at the critical moment to the battlefield. Before the attack on Levengaupt, a few days before, he ordered that troops rush to him to help his “corvolant” […]. Bour approached Lesnaya at the most decisive moment: the Russian attack after Bour's arrival overthrew the Swedes, who were trying to save the bridge on the road to Propoisk, which was of enormous importance for them. The Russians took the bridge, the Swedes, after a desperate new battle, returned it, but Levenhaupt clearly saw the absolute impossibility of holding the bridge and saving his convoy, which never reached Propoisk. When the dark and stormy snowy night (although it was September 28) stopped the battle, the situation for the Swedes turned out to be hopeless: the Russians occupied two positions - one taken from the Swedes in the morning, near the village of Lesnoy, and the second - near the bridge and not far from the Swedish convoy If the battle resumed on the morning of September 29, it was necessary to either lose the entire convoy and subject to complete defeat the part of the Swedish army that had survived the bloody battle on the 28th, or save the rest of the army and leave, leaving the convoy to the mercy of fate. Levenhaupt preferred, of course, the second. .. Under the cover of the pre-dawn darkness, he left. His defeated army did not even have time to destroy any significant part of its convoy, no matter how offensive it was for Levenhaupt to realize that almost all of this wealth, ammunition, food, which with such difficulty, at such colossal costs, Sweden sent to the king and which Levenhaupt himself spent months collected in Courland - that all this got safely (for the Russians, but not for the Swedes) to the Russians. Only artillery and gunpowder were not left in significant quantities to the Russians, but were drowned in swamps and in the rivers Lesnyanka and Sozhe. The Swedes, however, could not waste much time on these regrettable reflections; they had to hurry up. Having abandoned the convoy, leaving half of his army dead or captured in the fatal forest, Levenhaupt headed with hasty marches to the south, pursued along the way by raids of Russian cavalry.

Levengaupt's corps, which had suffered a severe defeat, having lost its entire huge baggage train, marched towards the king, subjected to constant small and not so small attacks from units of the Russian army marching in parallel or retreating in front of it. The Swedes walked through scorched villages abandoned by residents, and the closer they got to Starodub, the more difficult it was for them.

"THE BEGINNING DAY OF OUR GOOD"

Thanks to Charles’s strategic mistakes, part of his army was defeated at the Good Prince’s station. M. M. Golitsyn, and Levengaupt’s entire corps was completely defeated by Peter at the village of Lesnaya on September 28, 1708. All supplies fell into the hands of the Russians. Now Charles’s entire hope was in Little Russia, where he expected to find supplies and an ally in Hetman Mazepa. The victory at Lesnaya was Peter’s great success: he called September 28 “the beginning day of our good,” and it was true; the preponderance of military happiness began to lean noticeably on Peter's side from this year 1708.

Platonov S.F. A complete course of lectures on Russian history. St. Petersburg, 2000 http://magister.msk.ru/library/history/platonov/plats005.htm#gl2

MOTHER OF THE POLTAVA BATTLE

But the king, who was heading to Smolensk, turned sharply south into abundant Ruthenia, where the useless traitor to Peter, Hetman Mazepa, was waiting for him, and with his head he betrayed Levengaupt to Peter, who on September 28 was defeated at the village of Lesnoy on the Sozh by 14 thousand Russians and lost two-thirds of his 16,000-strong division with everything he brought to the king, including the Swedish invincible self-confidence. The Poltava victory at Vorskla was won at Lesnaya on Sozh: afterward, Peter himself recognized Lesnaya as the mother of the Poltava battle, which happened exactly nine months later. It was a shame to lose to Poltava after Lesnaya.

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Presentation on the topic: BATTLE OF FOREST (September 28, 1708).

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BATTLE OF FOREST. (September 28, 1708) “Mother of the Poltava Battle.” Compilers of the presentation: Students of the State Educational Institution “Secondary School No. 23 of Mogilev”: Olga Olegovna Bykova (10th grade); Ziganorova Maria Alekseevna (10th grade); Losenkov Daniil Olegovich (9th grade). Mentor: Educator – psychologist, history teacher of the State Educational Institution “Secondary School No. 23 of Mogilev” Chepelev Leonid Anatolyevich.

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CAUSES OF THE NORTHERN WAR (1700 - 1721). At the end of the 17th century and the first quarter of the 18th century, contradictions between the countries of the Baltic basin intensified. 1) Sweden, having pushed Russia away from the Baltic Sea and captured the Baltic states and significant territories of Northern Germany in a series of wars with Poland, Denmark, and the German states, turned the Baltic Sea into a “Swedish lake.” The dissatisfaction of the Baltic states with the dominance of Sweden and the fear of its further aggression created objective preconditions for the formation of an anti-Swedish coalition. 2) In November - December 1699, treaties between Russia and Denmark and Saxony on the war against Sweden (the “Northern Alliance”) were concluded in Moscow. Under this treaty, Russia undertook to open hostilities and actually began them after the conclusion of the Treaty of Constantinople with Turkey in 1700. 3) In this war, Russia was looking for access to the Baltic Sea and advocated the return of Russian lands, which objectively contributed to the economic development and strengthening of the country’s security. The Russian state entered the war with an army significantly inferior to the Swedish one in numbers and weapons, since the military reforms of Peter I, begun at the end of the 17th century, were completed only in the first decade of the 18th century.

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The French envoy wrote about Charles XII: “The king dreams of only one war (approx. - with Russia), he was told too much about the exploits and campaigns of his ancestors. His heart and head are filled with this, and he considers himself invincible.” Portrait of Charles XII painted in 1700.

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On the eve of the war with Russia, Denmark and Saxony, the Swedish Empire (as the kingdom of Sweden and its possessions were called in the period from 1561 - after the conquest of Estonia, to 1721) was one of the great powers of Europe and had the strongest army in Europe. After the defeat of Russia's allies, the Swedish king spent the entire 1707 in intensive preparation for the war against Russia. Armament of the Swedish infantry on the eve of the Northern War.

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Having completed the preparations, Charles XII set out on a campaign against Russia. In late autumn he moved from Poznan to Lithuania. And already on December 29, 1707, the Swedish army crossed the Vistula ice and moved to Mazovia along the shortest road - through dense forests, encountering all kinds of obstacles from the hostile population. Despite this, following his adventurous nature, Charles XII always wanted to follow the line of greatest resistance. With him were 35,000 soldiers and officers (out of a total of 116,000 that he could have had at his disposal). Of the 116,000 soldiers of the Swedish army, 35,000 were with the king, the rest were scattered throughout the northeast of Europe - 16,000 Levenhaupt in Livonia, 15,000 Liebecker in Finland, 42,000 garrisoned in the Baltic states, Swedish possessions in Germany (Pomerania and Holstein) and in Sweden itself. Also, Charles XII was forced to leave 8,000 soldiers of General Krassov in Poland to support the shaky throne of Leszczynski. Intoxicated by victories in Europe, Charles XII was confident of an easy victory over Russia. CONDITION OF THE SWEDISH ARMY AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST RUSSIA.

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The command of the Russian army knew that the Swedes would move to the Dvina and Livonia to join the troops of Levengaupt. Therefore, on the Russian side, in 1708, it was decided to retreat into the interior of the country, surround the Swedish army with flying detachments, disturb and delay it at every opportunity. And civilians were asked to go into the forests and swamps, burying everything that could not be taken with them. In the Pskov and Novgorod regions, weapons were distributed to the entire male population. To stop the advance of Charles XII with his army towards Moscow, Peter I left empty villages along the route of the Swedish army. The actions of the Russian army and the refusal of the population to help the Swedish army forced Charles to decide to go deep into Ukraine, where he hoped to replenish food and fodder supplies. Charles XII counted on the quick approach of General Levenhaupt's corps, which had at its disposal about 16,000 soldiers and a convoy of 7,000 carts with a 3-month supply of food and ammunition to join the main forces. PLAN OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY AND ACTIONS OF CHARLES XII IN THE FIRST MONTHS OF THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN.

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Karl counted on the help of the Crimean Tatars and Hetman Mazepa, who betrayed the Russians. Mazepa wanted to make the left and right bank of Ukraine the eternal property of Poland and hoped that Charles XII would help him with this. But Mazepa could not fulfill his promise to Charles XII to gather a huge army of Cossacks and organize constant food assistance from the population of Little Russia. Mazepa managed to bring only 2 thousand Cossacks to Karl. Most of the Cossacks and residents of Ukraine did not want to serve the traitor and refused to help the Swedish army. Mazepa persuaded Charles XII not to march directly to Moscow through Minsk and Smolensk, but to give the Swedish army a rest in Poltava. While besieging it, the Swedes lost two months and almost their entire gunpowder supply. By the time of the famous Battle of Poltava, the Swedish army had only 4 guns left. Hetman Ivan Mazepa and Charles XII

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A convoy of 7,000 carts loaded with food and ammunition was sent to help the Swedish army, guarded by the corps of General Levenhaupt. Receipt of the convoy by Charles XII would give the Swedish army enormous advantages over the Russian army. But Charles XII’s evasion to the south removed him from Levenhaupt’s corps, which Peter I decided to take advantage of. He sent the main forces of the Russian army, 7 thousand cavalry and 5 thousand infantry, to pursue the Swedish convoy, and led them personally. WHY PETER I DECIDED TO GIVE THE SWEDES A BATTLE AT FOREST. At the end of September 1708, the Swedish corps of 16,000 under the command of Levenhaupt was going to cross the Lesnyanka River. Having learned about the approach of Peter I with dragoons and cannons, the Swedish general took up defensive positions near the village of Lesnaya. Levenhaupt hoped to defend himself until the convoy, having crossed the bridge across the river, reached the city of Propoisk. But the Russian attack, which began on September 28 at 9 a.m., thwarted the plans of the Swedish commander.

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The Battle of Lesnaya September 28, 1708. The Battle of Lesnaya took place between a detachment of Russian troops led by Peter I and the Swedish corps of General A. Levengaupt. The first hours of the battle at Lesnaya. Engraving by N. Larmessen from a painting by artist P.D. Martin Jr.

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Stage 5 of the battle. At night, the Swedes retreated, abandoning half of the convoy and all their wounded. Many Swedes deserted during the night. In the morning, having discovered the flight of the Swedes, Peter I sent a detachment under the command of General Pflug in pursuit. The detachment caught up with and defeated the remnants of Levenhaupt's corps. Levenhaupt was left without a convoy, and Charles XII without food and ammunition. Russian artillerymen who prevented the Swedes from launching a counterattack on the Russian army at the Battle of Lesnaya

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RESULTS OF THE BATTLE OF FOREST Russian army Swedish army 16,000 soldiers took part in the battle. 30 guns. 16,000 soldiers took part in the battle. 17 guns. Losses: 1,111 killed and 2,856 wounded. Total 3967. Losses: 6397 killed and wounded, among them 45 officers. Part of the convoy with supplies of provisions and weapons was lost. Trophies: 700 Swedish soldiers were captured by Russians. 17 guns and 3,000 convoy carts loaded with provisions and ammunition were taken from the Swedes. Russian military doctors treated wounded Swedish soldiers abandoned by the Swedes to their fate. Trophies. The Swedish army had no trophies.

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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BATTLE OF FOREST. The Battle of Lesnaya had a serious impact on the further course of the Northern War. The significance of the battle for the Russian army: 1) Peter I called the victory at Lesnaya “the first soldier’s test” and “the mother of the Poltava battle.” 2) This victory showed the outstanding leadership qualities of Peter I. 3) Russian troops in the battle acted creatively, based on the situation: they entered the battle as forces approached, without waiting for their full deployment, combined fire with bayonet strikes, skillfully maneuvered on the battlefield, ensured close interaction between infantry and cavalry. 4) The victory at Lesnaya raised the morale of the Russian army and made them believe in their strength. The significance of the battle for the Swedish army: 1) The defeat of Levenhaupt’s corps deprived Charles XII of the reinforcements he needed: food and ammunition. This predetermined the defeat of the Swedes in the Battle of Poltava. 2) The plan for the Swedish army to march on Moscow was thwarted. 3) Upon learning of the defeat of General Levengaupt’s corps, Charles XII became despondent and began to lose faith in his army. 4) The spirit of the Swedish army fell and faith in victory over Russia was shaken. 5) In the eyes of European peoples, the Swedish army ceased to be invincible.

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In 1912, construction of a memorial chapel designed by architect A. Galen was completed on the former battlefield. In 1958, on the occasion of the 250th anniversary of the famous battle, a museum commemorating the Battle of Lesnaya was opened in the memorial chapel. In 1990, the museum was closed, its exhibits were transferred to the Mogilev Museum of Local Lore. E. Romanova. Nowadays there is a church in the name of St. Peter in the chapel. Memorial plaque in the chapel.

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Sources. V. A. Artamonov: 1708-2008. Mother of the Poltava Victory. Battle of Lesnaya // Society in Memory of Abbess Taisia, Russian Symphony, 2008; Military review. http://doc. opredelim.com/docs/index-23934.html?page=2; Virtual Museum “Heritage” http://www.slavgorod-museum.com/lesn.htm; 4. Danilov History of Russia IX - XIX centuries. Reference materials; 5. One Hundred Great Battles", Veche Publishing House, 2004; 6. Website “CHRONOS” http://www.hrono.ru/sobyt/1700sob/1708lesna.php; http://storyo.ru/nikolaev/52.htm; http://calendar.com/event/v-1708 - godu- proizoshla - bitva- pri –derevne - lesnoi.

310 years ago, on October 9, 1708, a battle took place that was included in all textbooks, accompanied by a fairly accurate wording from the winner. Peter the Great, personally winning a major battle against the Swedish corps for the first time Adam Ludwig Levenhaupt, called him this way: “Mother of Poltava Victoria.”

The definition is precise, beautiful and biting. But not quite enough. Peter I thought in terms of his time and certainly could not imagine that the tandem “Lesnaya plus Poltava” would become a happy exception in a rather sad series of historical events.

Very often one hears that Russia imagines too much about itself. Say, who needs you in your bearish corner? You might think that civilized countries only sleep and see how to conquer and enslave you.

In fact, such attempts have been made with alarming regularity over the past four hundred years. Every century, selected armies of Europe carried out large-scale invasions of Russia. And each time their main goal was to erase the Russian state from reality and history.

Moreover, once, in 1612, they generally succeeded. Russia did indeed fall under the rule of the Polish crown for some time. Twice - in that very year 1612, and then in 1812 - Moscow was captured and virtually destroyed by enemies. Once again, the invasion was stopped by an incredible effort almost a few miles from the capital: this happened in 1941. And only once was the invasion managed to be stopped and stopped at distant approaches. This is exactly Poltava in 1709.

Only such a formulation of the question can reveal the real meaning and real value of “Mother of Poltava Victoria”: the Battle of Lesnaya. It became the first impressive victory of the Russian army renewed by Peter.

From a purely formal point of view, Peter’s attack on Levengaupt’s corps was predetermined in advance. This was the only thing that a commander with any sense of sanity should have done. The fact is that the invasion of Russia by the king of Sweden Charles XII I had something serious in mind. The main goal was, of course, Moscow. Karl, this expert on ancient military history, had an idea about what the “Scythian war” was, when the enemy, retreating, leaves behind him a desert where there is nothing to profit from. And, of course, he knew that the Russians would do just that. Of course, the Russians did not disappoint their expectations.

Therefore, the rest of the course of events was predictable. Karl takes a huge convoy with him, since no one in Russia is going to feed him pies. Being careful and prudent, just in case, he orders the Governor-General of Livonia Adam Levengaupt to prepare another convoy, this time simply gigantic: for 7 thousand trucks. And slowly, under the protection and cover of a corps of 16 thousand people with 16 guns, all this joy was brought to the main forces of the Swedes. Who, having failed to achieve success in breaking through along the Smolensk road, decided to approach Moscow from the south and turned to Ukraine.

In a word, Levengaupt was walking with a convoy and knew for sure that the Russians would strike. Simply because they have to do it. The Russians, represented by Peter the Great, decided not to disappoint him and organized the pursuit of Levenhaupt's corps with the forces of a corvolant: a flying detachment of 8 thousand dragoons and 5 thousand infantry mounted on horseback. Plus 30 guns.

So, Peter showed himself to be at least a sane commander. And what about Levenhaupt?

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While waiting for Peter to strike, he had to be tormented by two questions: “Where?” And How?". That is, where the Russians will attack and how they will do it. In reality, Adam Ludwig only asked himself the first question. He didn’t think about “how” at all. Because I was confident in the Swedes. “The strongest army in Europe”, the mighty “Carolinas”, named after their sovereign Charles XII, they have been rolling into a thin pancake not only the “Russian barbarians”, but also any enemy for many years. The key to this was tactics based on the personal qualities of the Swedish soldier. According to the regulations, he had to withstand enemy fire, and then suddenly break the distance. He himself was allowed to shoot only after seeing the color of the eyes and pupils of the enemy. That is, from a distance of no more than 20 steps. And even better - 10. The standard caliber of small arms was then 20 mm. A single salvo of two-centimeter pieces of lead almost point-blank was guaranteed to mow down the enemy, stunned by such impudence. A bayonet attack completed the job. In Europe, no one else had sufficient training and composure to repeat these, in general, simple techniques.

The first clash near the village of Lesnaya showed that the Swedish commander did not seem to be very mistaken. The Russians, deploying their forces, stumbled upon an ambush. Here is what General Levenhaupt himself writes about this in his memoirs: “Meanwhile, our infantry successfully clashed with the enemy, captured two or three cannons, and his infantry began to yield... Tsar Peter himself held back the fleeing ones with kind and strong words.”

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It is a pity that the general does not specify what kind of “kind” and “strong” words Peter I used. Although he could have done this: Adam Ludwig wrote his memoirs in Moscow. But not as a winner, but as a prisoner of war. In general, I should have learned to express myself “in mother’s way” and in a dozen other ways.

In any case, Peter's words were effective. The Russians stopped fleeing, and help came to them in the form of Peter's guard. Now it’s the turn to check how good the notorious “Carolinas” are against the Preobrazhensky and Semyonovtsy, who did not waste time in vain and in the years that passed after the “embarrassment” near Narva, not only adopted the Swedish experience, but also added something of their own to it.

Levenhaupt could not even imagine what happened after that in a nightmare: “The Russian volley was like a lightning strike and shocked even the oldest Swedish officers... The lieutenant colonel was killed, and the banners were lost, the soldiers fled. Seeing this, the enemy made a turn and fired such a volley into their backs, from which the soldiers fell like grass under a scythe, after which he pursued them until at least one person remained ... "

Monument in honor of the 200th anniversary of the victory at Lesnaya. Photo: Commons.wikimedia.org

This was only the very beginning of the battle. The Russian guards showed that they knew how to control fire much better than the Carolinas. In principle, it was possible to solve the matter with this alone: ​​the Swedes fled almost everywhere during the battle, huddling in a hastily fortified camp. It was then that Levenhaupt greatly regretted that, because of his arrogance and arrogance, he did not think about either retreat or the camp: “The Swedes despised digging in against the Muscovite army, and such arrogance became the reason for their defeat.”

In fact, the main reason was not so much arrogance as banal rain and snow, which disabled flintlock guns. The Russians abandoned the demonstration of fire training and struck with bayonets. This was the same famous Russian bayonet attack that terrified the armies of Europe three hundred years later. But the Swedes were the first to try it: “The last onslaught of the Russians was carried out with the greatest ferocity... They went into a frenzy... From our last reserves - 2 battalions and 10 squadrons - no more than 70 people remained... Most of us, fleeing, mounted horses, hoping to find the general , but no one could say where he was...” The general fled at that time, hoping to find the main forces of the Swedes and their king Charles. And I found them. But Poltava was ahead...