Golosov g in comparative politics download fb2. Political scientist Grigory Golos on the Navalny phenomenon in the context of global political trends

Navalny is “Putin 2.0,” a politician with authoritarian tendencies and a potential new dictator. Navalny is the only real leader who deserves the opposition-minded part of society to unite around him. The discussion that has unfolded around the figure of Navalny in recent days has shown that concerns about the views, character and tactics of the most famous opposition figure in Russia are as great as his popularity among opponents of the current government. Who is afraid of Alexei Navalny and why, and how justified are these worries? Who is Navalny - the Russian Trump, the Russian Macron, or perhaps a rejuvenated reincarnation of Yeltsin?

Since being released from arrest, where he spent a month following mass protests on Russia Day on June 12, Navalny has made several controversial moves. First, a situation arose with activist Alexander Turovsky, who was beaten by special forces in one of Navalny’s election headquarters. Turovsky stated that “I never saw any help from Navalny. I did not hear a single word of support or participation in the fate of a person who participated in his campaign literally at the risk of his life.”. The situation turned out to be so egregious that Navalny was accused of arrogance, lack of empathy and unwillingness to protect his own supporters. Even more questions were raised by Navalny’s statement that if Putin agrees to a “peaceful transit of power,” the current president and his family should be provided with security guarantees:

Finally, Navalny’s decision to hold a debate with one of the former leaders of the separatists operating in eastern Ukraine, the leader of the Novorossiya movement, Igor Strelkov (Girkin), caused quite a stir. The debate is scheduled for July 20.

All this became a reason for a dispute between analysts, journalists and political activists about Navalny. The extreme pro and con positions in these discussions look something like this.

Russia is poor in opposition, and there is no doubt that Alexei Navalny is currently the most gifted of the opposition politicians. He has not made any significant mistakes, and most importantly, he constantly acts. This is the main requirement for a politician: to constantly be afloat, to find some new moves. The authorities are fighting him quite harshly. Despite this, Navalny has always managed to find some kind of answer that allows him to expand his target audience. Leader? Yes, of course, leader. But you need to understand that politics in the world is becoming more personalized. Russia is no exception here - this is an objective trend. The very word "leader" in Russian has negative connotations, simply because we have unpleasant memories of Stalin, who was called the great leader. But politics, I repeat, has always been personalized. To reproach a politician for wanting to be a leader is to reproach him for wanting to be a politician. I understand that some of the commentators who scold Navalny for the notorious leaderism simply do not want the Russian opposition to have a leader, that is, for there to be an opposition in Russia. Other people experience a strange aberration of consciousness based on negative historical experiences. But if we want Russia to be a democracy, we must come to terms with the fact that in Russia there will be political organizations that will have leaders.

Leader? Yes, of course, leader. But politics in the world is becoming more personalized

​- You are talking about negative historical experience, but here you can also recall a not so long-standing experience, not the Soviet one, but, say, the turn of the 1980-90s. To many, Navalny resembles Yeltsin at the beginning of his perestroika career, which led him to the presidency. Then, too, there was a lot of talk about Yeltsin as a battering ram against the communists, who should fulfill this historical function, and then, they say, we’ll sort it out. The consequences, as we know, were very ambiguous, like the entire period of Yeltsin’s rule. Perhaps the current worries are precisely caused by the fact that people are afraid of a repetition: an opposition leader who comes to power, but then does not build a system in which there would be democratic checks and balances?

In conversations about Yeltsin there was a very definite rational grain, namely: Yeltsin, in general, was not a democrat. He was a nomenklatura worker by birth, at some point he broke with the Communist Party, but, as many rightly suspected, this did not make him a democrat. He became and remained until the end of his career a completely consistent anti-communist, but he also had pronounced authoritarian tendencies. I don’t observe any serious authoritarian tendencies in Navalny. His claim to lead a political movement is natural to any democratic order. If there is politics, then there must be people who claim to play prominent roles in it. Navalny is not burdened with the same life and political experience that Yeltsin had. I understand that, as they say, a frightened crow is afraid of a bush, but we need to realize that these are completely different situations - the one then with Yeltsin and the one that now exists with Navalny.

- You also mentioned the international context, the tendency towards personalization of politics. We see people like Donald Trump and Emmanuel Macron emerging - very different, but nevertheless they have something in common. They are somewhat omnivorous in terms of ideology, in terms of traditional ideologies, left or right. Is there a danger here that the program for some real social changes will be replaced by a person: trust me, and I will do everything? After all, this has happened more than once in history.

It is necessary to distinguish between personalization and de-ideologization of politics. These are different things. Personalization is an objective tendency that simply returns politics to its natural state. Politics has almost always been deeply personal. The only exception is the rather short post-war period, somewhere before the 1960s, when mass political parties reached their peak and heyday. They served as intermediaries in the relationship between the masses and politicians. Under these conditions, the politician did not need to be flashy. This does not mean that there were no bright politicians then; it is enough to remember de Gaulle, for example. But still, the voter could identify himself directly with the party; he did not have to follow a specific politician. However, the era of mass parties has passed irrevocably. They were killed by the welfare states in the West, and especially by the mass media, which led to the death of the party press. The parties simply no longer have the amount of work they did with voters in the middle of the last century. Nowadays, parties are also important, but during election campaigns they perform mainly organizational functions, they have become such machines for collecting votes, and solve technical problems. And the person who attracts votes, speaks in the media and becomes noticeable to voters is a politician, a person. There is nothing you can do about it; we will live in a world in which this trend will only increase, including due to the development of social networks. Nowadays it is much easier for a politician to be noticed than before. Moreover, if you are invisible, you cannot become a politician.

It is now much easier for a politician to be noticed than before

Does this kill ideology? Sometimes yes, sometimes no, it depends on the specific situation in the country. You said that there is a big difference between Trump and Macron, I would like to highlight this difference. The phenomena of Trump and Macron, in my opinion, are completely different. Trump is a conservative politician; he has a very consistent, in my opinion, ideological agenda that combines social conservatism and nationalism. To be honest, I don’t see a single significant deviation from this agenda in Trump’s rhetoric. I have no sympathy for this ideology, but I must admit that Trump owes his success largely to the fact that he was able to successfully combine two things at the level of rhetoric: these are conservative ideas that the Tea Party in the United States has long professed, but which it could not provide them with sufficient citizen support, and the brand of nationalism that has proven to appeal to the masses in the United States.

As for Macron, the situation there is different. French politics has always been ideologically polarized and remains so. The French think of themselves in ideological terms. But at the same time, both the socialists and the right-wing Republican party at the start of the current presidential campaign had discredited themselves to such an extent that they left ideologically committed voters with a choice of drifting either to the far left, like Mélenchon, or to the far right, like Marin Le Pen. But at the same time, there remained a significant mass of voters who were not ready for such a drift.

- So Macron picked up the ownerless?

Yes, I picked up the ownerless, and it was, I repeat, situational. When Macron starts pursuing realpolitik, it will be either right, which is most likely, or left. The traditional coordinate system for French politics will be restored. Here we are dealing with fluctuation, oscillation of the system. However, in the case of Trump, on the contrary, this is a completely natural course of events, the usual pendulum of the electorate’s movement from left to right.

- You say that in some cases the personification of politics kills ideology, in others it does not. But isn’t it also killing democracy and its institutions? The temptation is too great to turn this personification into something more - into Caesarism, Bonapartism, dictatorship, you can call it different things.

Elections can be organized anywhere, but the very structure of democracy is designed precisely to prevent the transition to dictatorship. Does this mechanism work ideally? No, it always involves risks. We know cases of the establishment of authoritarian regimes as a result of democratically elected leaders coming to power. But the system generally works, especially in older democracies like the United States. We see what is happening with Trump now. He even implements those aspects of his election program that generally fit within the framework of traditional American politics with enormous difficulty. He faces constant opposition, even though his party now has a majority in both houses of the US Congress. Is part of the American public rightly concerned that the risk of authoritarianism may materialize? Of course that's right. Because public opinion plays an important role in democracy. Should we perceive these risks in a very dramatic way? I guess not.

- The US, as you yourself said, is a fairly old, established democracy. This cannot be said about Russia; everything is not very good with democratic institutions. Therefore, perhaps, the risk of another authoritarianism is higher?

I consider him tall, naturally. But you don’t need to be a political scientist to come to the conclusion that this risk is high. It is enough just to be guided by common sense and understand that good things will not immediately come out of bad things. Any way out of a bad situation comes with the possibility that it will actually get worse. Political struggle is needed precisely in order to neutralize risks. Of course, it would be bad if at the moment of Russia's exit from the authoritarian order, whenever this happens, only Navalny remained on the political arena. There is nothing particularly terrible about this, because in conditions of democratization a natural counterbalance to it would arise immediately. Already now we see a lot of people who criticize Navalny, partly because they intend, if he wins, to immediately form an opposition to him within the framework of the democratic order. In this regard, I am more concerned about the fact that the current government is constantly clearing the political field with repressive measures, corrupting possible other politicians, and thereby really contributes to the fact that Navalny at the time of the change of power may remain the only real politician. This is bad. I don’t see Navalny himself clearing out this field, he is not capable of it, and I believe there is no need. This risk comes from the current government.

The authorities are constantly clearing the political field with repressive measures

​- You recently published a series of articles about models of transition from authoritarianism to democracy in different countries, from Spain to Brazil. Have you been able to identify any indispensable conditions that allow you to say with a high degree of confidence that yes, in this case you will get democracy, and the matter will not end with a simple change of scenery? Or is each case absolutely individual, and in each case everything depends on how the card falls?

There are, of course, general patterns of democratization. The main one is that in general for regime change, not necessarily in the direction of democracy, it is necessary that within the ruling class, and a fairly narrow class at that - on the scale of Russia, say, these are several thousand people who make key decisions - there should be serious dissatisfaction with this , what policies are being pursued by the top of the ruling group. In the literature, this is sometimes called a split among the elites. This is the key condition. We know of no examples of democratization where there would not be such a split. The second condition is that at the moment when such disagreements arise, there should be opposition politicians in the country who do not belong to this narrow ruling class. Because within the ruling group, authoritarianism can only be replaced by another authoritarianism. It is necessary that some factions within this group begin to interact with the opposition, which is not involved in the current government. How to interact? In the traditional political science literature there was such an idyllic idea that there must be some kind of formal pact, a peaceful agreement on the transfer of power. This is not necessarily the case. But in essence, the process always boils down to the fact that a coalition is formed from some parts of the ruling group and parts of the opposition.

And the third condition for regime change not to lead to the formation of a new authoritarianism is that the population, firstly, has some dissatisfaction with the existing authoritarian order, and secondly, at least a small level of understanding that democracy is an alternative to this order. It is important that people grasp the idea that any government that does not change sooner or later becomes bad, even if it starts out as good. This is the essence of the democratic belief that power should be replaceable. If this idea is conveyed to the broad masses in one way or another, then the process of democratization is facilitated. However, the first condition, I must repeat once again, is key, and it is precisely this condition that I, to tell the truth, do not see in Russia now. The situation with the second condition is also very bad. On the surface of the Russian opposition spectrum, no one except Navalny is currently visible; everyone else is more or less incorporated into the existing system, interacting with it much more widely and comprehensively than Navalny does.

- Is Navalny still interacting?

I would like to say more about this. One of the fairly common thoughts in the stream that is now pouring out on Navalny is that he is an agent of the Kremlin. It is difficult to substantiate this idea, since we all see that the Kremlin treats Navalny quite harshly. The only thing he hasn’t done yet is put him in prison for a long time, although this option is also not excluded, Navalny constantly walks under such a threat. But if I knew that some kind of minimal coordination between the Kremlin, some groups within the narrow ruling class, and Navalny exists, then, firstly, it would not surprise me, and secondly, it would not belittle me in in my eyes, Navalny. Moreover, I believe that if Navalny is to have political success, and this is possible, then such coordination must be established. Russian politics is not public; a significant part of political processes occurs behind the scenes.

The art of politics is the art of using people in general, but a real politician knows how to use not only his friends, but also his enemies

​- Well, suppose one fine day facts emerge that yes, there is such, as you call it, coordination. At the same time, Navalny has been building up the image of an uncompromising fighter against the regime for years. News about “coordination” will deal an irreparable blow to such an image. Is not it so?

No. Because politics is interaction, it is needed so that people, to put it bluntly, do not kill each other. When politics enters the real phase of the struggle for power, enemies very often interact with each other. Moreover, they use each other. The art of a politician is the art of using people in general, but a real politician knows how to use not only his friends, but also his enemies. Moreover, we must extend this maxim to both ruling politicians and opposition ones. If you know how to use your enemy, then you are a real politician. I would like to believe that Navalny can do this too. But you need to understand that when you use someone, you allow yourself to be used - this is inevitable. The art of compromise in this case is not to allow yourself to be used to the detriment of your cause - this is really difficult, but real politicians know how to do it.

- In this context, do you consider Navalny’s recent loud statement that he is ready to provide security guarantees to Putin if something happens, and at the same time he will have a much tougher attitude towards Medvedev, do you consider the right political move?

That Putin will need to be provided with security guarantees is presupposed by the vast majority of possible democratization scenarios in Russia. From this point of view, what Navalny said is simply an obvious thing. As for the gradation of guarantees, what to give to Putin and what to Medvedev, we must proceed from the fact that the real leader of the regime is Putin, and Medvedev, both from the point of view of Putin himself and from the point of view of Navalny, is such a consumable material. Navalny concentrates his blow on the topic of corruption; from this point of view, he cannot be particularly soft towards Medvedev. But the most important thing is that Putin, with all the personal obligations that he bears to Medvedev, will not have any special incentives to protect him if something happens.

Perhaps Putin will be able to put an end to Navalny's political activities if he deems it appropriate after the presidential elections

​- The process that is officially called the Russian presidential elections will soon take place. Putin will most likely end up in the Kremlin for another term. Could the main political content of this period be the emergence of conditions for potential democratization, which, as you say, have not yet matured in Russia? Or is it running over a longer distance, where five or six years won’t do?

Hard to say. The Putin regime emerged as a regime of personal power. Such regimes develop to a large extent depending on the moods, states, and thoughts of the people who lead them. There is no institutional logic that we could use as a basis for forecasting the further development of the regime. It is now more or less clear to me that this regime has not yet passed the peak of its development. But what his policy will be when this peak is reached, and what the logic of its collapse will be, largely depends on the personal circumstances of Vladimir Putin, literally - on his health. If his health is good, then I believe that he will be able to make sufficient efforts to slow down the development of the real opposition in Russia. It is quite possible that he will eventually be able to put an end to Navalny’s political activities, if after the presidential elections he considers this possible and appropriate. Then the Russian opposition will largely have to start all over again. But predicting such outcomes is extremely difficult. After all, we cannot guess Putin’s individual preferences, but only the general logic of his behavior related to maintaining power. What conclusions he personally will come to regarding the optimal strategy for maintaining power is a completely separate question that is difficult to answer.

Yaroslav Shimov

Deputy Director of the Russian Service for MS since July 2017.

Professional interests:

Comparative political science, comparative research methodology, political processes in Russian regions.

Monographs:

• Russian party system and regional politics. St. Petersburg: European University Publishing House, 2006, 299 p.
• Political Parties in the Regions of Russia: Democracy Unclaimed. Boulder, CO, and London: Lynne Rienner, 2004, xvii + 305 pp.
• Party systems in Russia and Eastern European countries: genesis, structures, dynamics. M.: The whole world, 1999, 152 p.
• Modes of Communist Rule, Democratic Transition, and Party System Formation in Four East European Countries (Donald W. Treadgold Paper in Russian, East European and Central Asian Studies No. 9), Seattle, WA: Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington, 1996, 123 pp.

Articles and chapters in Russian:

• “About the Imperial system”, Information Bulletin of the Deputy Association of the political party “United Russia” in the Tambov Regional Duma, No. 4 (7), 2009, p. 82-86. “Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia,” Pro et Contra, No. 1, 2008, p. 22-35.
• “Publication of Russian electoral data: problems and solutions”, Russian Electoral Review, No.1, 2007, p. 60-65.
• “Summary Russian electoral statistics, December 2003 - April 2007”, Russian Electoral Review, No.1, 2007, p. 66-133.
• “Resource bases of candidates in the elections of regional legislative assemblies and the formation of political parties” // A. Sazonov et al. (ed.), Pro Nunc: Modern political processes, Vol. 4, Tambov: Yulis, 2006, p. 106-115.
• “Strategic manipulation of the field of political alternatives as a mechanism of “managed democracy”” // Putin’s regime: ideas and practice, M.: V. Sekachev, 2005, p. 7-61
• “Representation of public organizations in party lists in the elections of regional legislative assemblies, December 2003 - October 2004. ” // N. Petrov (ed.), Civil society and political processes in the regions, M.: Moscow Carnegie Center, 2005, p. 38-47.
• “Age composition of regional legislative elites in Russia, 1999-2003” // A. Duka and V. Mokhov (eds.), Power, state and elites in modern society, Perm: Perm State Technical University Publishing House, 2005, p. 122-136.
• “Fabricated majority: conversion of votes into seats in the 2003 Duma elections”, Polis: Political Studies, No.1, 2005, p. 108-119.
• “Political institutions and women’s access to representation in legislative assemblies of Russian regions” // N. Stepanova and E. Kochkina (eds.), Gender reconstruction of political systems, St. Petersburg: Aletheya, 2004, p. 677-702.
• “Electoral systems and party fragmentation in the regions of Russia, 1993-2003” // A. Duka, ed. Power and elites in modern Russia. SPb.: Sociological Society named after. Kovalevsky, 2003, p. 295-308.
• “Political parties and independent candidates in the Duma elections” // V. Gelman et al., ed. Second electoral cycle in Russia, 1999-2000. M.: The whole world, 2002, p. 43-64.
• “Strategies for the re-election of incumbents in the Duma elections” // V. Gelman et al., ed. Second electoral cycle in Russia, 1999-2000. M.: The whole world, 2002, p. 134-157, with Yu. Shevchenko.
• “Elections of regional legislative assemblies (1993-2001)” // V. Avdonin, ed. Elections of government bodies in the Ryazan region. Ryazan: RGPU im. Yesenina, 2002, p. 72-86.
• “Political institutions and democracy in Russia”, Emergency Reserve, No. 5, 2001, p. 30-34. “Dimensions of Russian regional electoral systems”, Polis: Political Studies, No. 4, 2001, p. 71-85.
• “Parties in power and Russian institutional design: a theoretical analysis”, Polis: Political Studies, No. 1, 2001, p. 6-15, and in the book: V. Nechaev and A. Filippov (eds.), All politics: a reader. M.: Europe, 2006, p. 322-331, with A. Lichtenstein.
• “Development of political parties in the regions of Russia” // M. Gorny, ed. Elections in the Russian Federation: federal and regional aspects, vol. 1. St. Petersburg: Norma, 2000, p. 74-78.
• “Social networks and electoral behavior” // G. Golosov and E. Meleshkina, eds. Political sociology and modern Russian politics. St. Petersburg: Borey-print, 2000, p. 100-125, with Yu. Shevchenko.
• “Political parties at the regional level” // G. Golosov and E. Meleshkina, eds. Political sociology and modern Russian politics. St. Petersburg: Borey-print, 2000, p. 226-271.
• “Elites, all-Russian parties, local electoral systems: on the reasons for the development of political parties in the regions of Russia,” Social Sciences and Modernity, No. 3, 2000, p. 51-75.
• “Governors and Party Politics,” Pro et Contra, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2000, p. 96-108.
• “The origin of modern Russian political parties, 1987-1993” // V. Gelman et al., eds. The first electoral cycle in Russia, 1993-1996. M.: The whole world, 2000, p. 77-105.
• “Political parties and electoral politics in 1993-1995.” // V. Gelman et al., eds. The first electoral cycle in Russia, 1993-1996. M.: The whole world, 2000, p. 106-129.
• “Factors of electoral success in single-mandate districts” // V. Gelman et al., ed. The first electoral cycle in Russia, 1993-1996. M.: The whole world, 2000, p. 130-151, with Yu. Shevchenko.
• “Electoral system and inter-party competition in the Duma elections” // V. Gelman et al., ed. The first electoral cycle in Russia, 1993-1996. M.: The whole world, 2000, p. 152-176, with N. Yargomskaya.
• “Independent candidates and dependent voters: the influence of social networks on electoral politics in Russia,” Polis: Political Studies, No. 4, 1999, p. 108-121, and in the book: L. Galkina and T. Shmachkova, eds. University political science of Russia. M.: Non-profit partnership “Polis”, 1999, p. 38-49, with Yu. Shevchenko.
• “Ideological development of parties and the field of inter-party competition in the 1995 Duma elections in Russia,” World Economy and International Relations, No. 3, 1999, p. 39-48.

Publications on the portal:

Training courses

Golosov G.V. Comparative political science and Russian politics, 2010-2015: collection of articles / Transl. from English I.S. Grigorieva. - St. Petersburg: Publishing house of the European University in St. Petersburg, 2016. - 668 p. ISBN 978-5-94380-211-9

A collection of scientific articles by a famous Russian political scientist, published in English in 2010-2015, translated into Russian. The articles are devoted to both methodological problems of political science, including tools for measuring the fragmentation and nationalization of party systems, and substantive problems of comparative politics and the study of modern Russian politics. The main topics of the articles are democracy and electoral authoritarianism, the formation of party systems in Russia and abroad, the functioning mechanisms and political consequences of electoral systems, the representation of women in legislative bodies, political processes in the regions of Russia. For teachers of political science, graduate students, students, as well as for everyone interested in politics and political science.

From the author. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
Effective number of batches: a new approach. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Classification of party systems: a methodological study. . . 35
To classify party systems in democracies, step one: established
new unit of analysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Towards the classification of party systems in democracies, step two:
division of units into categories. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Party system format and durability: An empirical assessment. . . 125
Regional elections in Russia, 2003-2007: incorporation of regional
ny autocracies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
Regional roots of electoral authoritarianism in Russia. . . . . . 178
Party systems in autocracies: models of emergence, sustainability
news and survival. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
Political machines: the concept and its implications for research
post-Soviet space. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
Proportional representation and authoritarianism: the case of reform
we regional electoral legislation in Russia. . . 259
The limits of electoral engineering in authoritarianism: an interesting case
tea application of the method of largest averages Imperiali in Russia 279
The last refuge of political regionalism: electoral
blocs in elections to Russian regional legislative
from the meeting, 2003-2005. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308
In defense of mixed electoral systems with a single vote. . . . . 334
Does electoral authoritarianism promote representation?
women? According to elections to regional legislative
meetings in Russia 1999-2011. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361
Interdependence effect in mixed unrelated electoral
systems: an empirical test using data on women's participation in subnational elections. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 382
The role of co-optation in the process of creating systems with a dominant party: the case of Russia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 411
Territorial genealogy of Russian parties and transplantable
ity of political machines. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 436
September 2013 regional elections in Russia: the worst of both worlds
worlds. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 459
The influence of various methods of distributing mandates in proportional
national system on the fragmentation of the legislature: the case of Russia. . . 477
Nationalization of the party system: problems of measurement in application
tions to federal states. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 504
Factors of nationalization of the party system. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 529
The unusual dynamics of the nationalization of the party system in Russia. . 555
Factors of fragmentation of the party system: cross-national use
following. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 584
The influence of spoiler parties: instrumental manipulation of politics
parties in conditions of electoral authoritarianism, random
Russian tea. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 614
Party systems, electoral systems and parliamentary frag-
mentation: A cross-national empirical study. . . . 643
Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 668

Textbook. - 3rd ed., revised. and additional - uh Europe. University in St. Petersburg, 2001. - 368 p. (Transactions of the Faculty of Political Sciences and Sociology; issue 2). 18VM 5-94380-010-7

Scientific editor - Yu.D. Shevchenko

"With the support of the Open Society Institute"

(Soros Foundation). Russia"

The textbook covers the origins and nature of comparative politics, the theoretical tools of political research, and its main areas of application: political culture and participation, interest groups, political parties, elections, the executive branch, parliaments and non-elected authorities. The educational material is richly illustrated with examples from the political life of various countries and statistical

For students of higher educational institutions studying in the direction and specialty "Political Science", graduate students, teachers and researchers, as well as for everyone who is interested in the problems of political LIFE I

PREFACE 5

Chapter I

ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT

COMPARATIVE POLITICAL SCIENCE 9

The Origins of Modern Political Analysis 10

Behaviorism 14

The emergence of comparative politics 17

Development and current state of comparative political science 23

Chapter II

THEORETICAL MEANS OF COMPARATIVE

POLITICAL STUDIES 35

Basic concepts of political analysis 35

Cross-national comparison 40

Nation state 52

Chapter III

POLITICAL REGIMS 63

The problem of classifying political regimes 63

Models of democracy 92

Chapter IV

POLITICAL CULTURE AND PARTICIPATION ... 100

Political culture and political socialization 101

Civic culture 104

Political subcultures……………………………………………………... 110

Political culture of the elite 113

Ideology 117

Political participation 123

Chapter V

STAKEHOLDER GROUPS 131

Classification of Interest Groups 132

Channels and sources of influence 137

Neocorporatism 144

Chapter VI

POLITICAL PARTIES 150

Functions and classification of parties 151

Classification of party systems 162

Origin and development of party systems 171

Chapter VII

ELECTORAL SYSTEMS 186

Majority Electoral Systems 189

Proportional and mixed electoral systems 200

Electoral engineering

and manipulation of the electoral system 211

Chapter VIII

ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR 223

Theories of expressive behavior of voters 223

Theories of rational voter behavior 235

Electoral politics and institutional influences

on voter behavior 243

Chapter IX

EXECUTIVE POWER 254

Functions and types of executive power 254

Presidential systems 264

Parliamentary system 281

Chapter X

PARLIAMENTS 287

Classification of parliaments and their functions 289

Organizational structure of parliaments 301

Political structure of parliaments 306

Chapter XI

NON-ELECTED AUTHORITIES 314

Bureaucracy 314

Judicial branch 331

Mass Communications and Politics 334

AFTERWORD 339

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL LIST 342

INDEX OF CHARTS AND TABLES 352

INDEX OF NAMES 354

COUNTRY INDEX AND REFERENCE

INFO 359

PREFACE

Five years have passed since the manuscript of the second edition of this textbook was submitted to the Novosibirsk University Publishing House. Is a third one needed? A characteristic phenomenon of recent years is the abundant, never-ending flow of educational literature on political science. One gets the impression that all Russian political scientists do is write textbooks: after all, the research literature on the problems of modern Russian politics (at least in monographic form) is quite small, and what exists is usually written and published not in Russian. The very word “political scientist” in Russia is much more often referred to as professional election campaign organizers, political consultants and journalists than as representatives of the corresponding academic discipline, which is quite widely represented in universities. There is no one to study politics. Scientists are busy with textbooks.

This state of affairs is, of course, not accidental. Textbooks are not only the final stage in the development of any scientific discipline, but to a certain extent also the initial stage. Most of the literature on political science published in Western Europe and the USA at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries was also intended for teachers and students - after all, the scientific community did not yet exist, and research works in political science simply did not have an addressee. It was the textbooks that constituted the community in the sense that the basic “message” of each of them was: political science is what is written here; other political science is wrong. A fairly high level of conceptual and methodological innovation is also characteristic of educational literature circulated today in Russia. Perhaps some of these textbooks will actually form the basis of scientific circles or even - who knows - entire research areas of local significance. In the textbook offered to the reader’s attention, starting from its first version (1994), I did not pursue a wide range of

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staff goals such as creating a new science or radically reforming an existing one. On the contrary, I proceeded from the recognition that political science already exists, if not in Russia, but in the world around it. Good or bad, this science has been developing in its current form for several decades, and the main purpose of the textbook is simply to inform the interested reader about its development and current state. This goal is neither ambitious nor original, and it cannot be said that it is alien to some of the textbooks already published. However, at best, these textbooks inform the reader about the state of science ten years ago. Previous editions of this work are also outdated - after all, political science does not stand still. Hence the desire to make changes and additions to the textbook, reflecting the development of science, but at the same time maintaining the systematic nature of the presentation of the material. I will dwell in more detail on the main differences between this publication and the book that was published five years ago.

The main part of the changes is due to the need to bring the content of the textbook into greater compliance with the current state of research practice. The material characterizing the leading paradigms at the present stage of development of comparative political science - the theory of rational choice and neo-institutionalism - has been somewhat expanded. When describing political regimes, much more attention is paid to the problems of democratization than before. The chapters on political culture and interest groups have been expanded. From the chapter “Political Parties and Elections” there are separate chapters on electoral systems and electoral behavior. It is these important and rapidly developing research areas in recent years that the previous edition of the textbook devoted unforgivably little space. The chapters on the executive branch, parliaments and unelected authorities have changed less significantly, but there are changes there too. The statistical material illustrating certain provisions of the textbook has been expanded and updated.

As in the previous edition, I found it possible to refrain from providing bibliographical references in the text. The bibliography at the end of the book serves a different purpose. The fact is that a large number of research papers were used when working on the textbook. Links to each of them are impossible.

Preface 1

Rarely in the text of a textbook would they make it unreadable. But to completely do without reference and bibliographic apparatus would be incorrect and, perhaps, unethical. The bibliography lists those books and articles that are mentioned - and sometimes even cited - in the textbook. It is clear that such a list cannot claim to be an exhaustive bibliography on comparative political science. Some of the works included in it are only indirectly related to this discipline. And vice versa, it did not include many works in Russian, which I would strongly recommend using in the educational process. But in the end, working with literature is a task that I cannot do for each individual teacher or student. In addition, the list includes corrections of some inaccuracies that crept into the previous edition of the textbook.

Basically, however, the concept of the textbook remained unchanged. It is intended for people studying comparative political science - both for teachers and for undergraduate and graduate students, as well as for all those who, for civic reasons or because of their occupation, feel the need to join modern political knowledge. Being a textbook, the book breaks with the bad tradition of Soviet social science, which demanded that such publications provide comprehensive and final answers to all questions. On the contrary, the main focus of the presentation of theoretical material is on the competing concepts and debates in which the scientific community develops. For readers thirsting for absolute truths, this textbook is unlikely to help. Paying due attention to theory, I attached special importance to “squeezing” into the text of the textbook as much empirical data, illustrations, and examples from the life of individual states as possible. I hope that the book can be used as a reference on a wide range of political issues.

This publication was made possible within the framework of cooperation between the Faculty of Political Science and Sociology of the European University in St. Petersburg and the Department of Sociology, Political Science and Management of the Faculty of Sociology of Samara State University, carried out under the program to support departments of the Megaproject “Development of Education in Russia” of the Open Society Institute. I express to the Institute my deepest

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side, sincere gratitude. It is important to note that the role of the department support program was not only and not so much in financing the publication (although there is no need to say that without this it most likely would not have taken place), but in providing me with the opportunity to correlate the content of the textbook with the demands of modern teaching practice in university My communication with Samara colleagues on the project, as well as with teachers, graduate students and graduates of the European University in St. Petersburg played a big role in working on the textbook. I would like to express special gratitude to V.Ya. Gelman and Yu.D. Shevchenko, whose advice and comments brought a lot of new things into the substantive part of my work, as well as M.Yu. Kondratieva, who kindly took upon herself a significant part of the organizational burden associated with the re-publication of the book.