Cheat sheet: Phenomenology. Phenomenology Phenomenology main issues and representatives

12.02.2024

Phenomenology (the study of phenomena) is one of the most original and significant trends in philosophy of the 20th century. The emergence of phenomenology was facilitated by the ideas of Descartes, Leibniz, Berkeley, Kant and the neo-Kantians of the Marburg school. Dilthey made a significant contribution to the creation of phenomenology. But the founder of phenomenology as an independent doctrine is E. Husserl. The ideas of phenomenology have a number of similarities with the philosophy of Buddhism, although it is unknown whether Husserl himself was familiar with it.

On the basis of Husserl's philosophy and largely under his influence, phenomenology developed as a complex, multifaceted movement of modern philosophy. At the same time, some researchers began to develop Husserl's phenomenological idealism(M. Heidegger, G. Shpet, etc.), while others - phenomenological method analysis, using it to study ethical, cultural-historical, ontological and similar problems (M. Scheler, N. Hartmann, P. Ricoeur, etc.). Phenomenology had a serious influence on a number of other philosophical teachings of the 20th century, primarily on existentialism and hermeneutics.

Phenomenology is based on two fundamental ideas:

Firstly, every person has consciousness, which is self-evident for any thinking being (remember Descartes: “I think, therefore I exist”);

Secondly, since the instrument of cognition of everything that lies beyond the limits of consciousness (i.e., the external world) is consciousness, then any objects or facts of reality are cognized and realized by us only by being somehow captured and manifested in consciousness. Consequently, everything that we know is, strictly speaking, not the objects or facts of reality themselves, but their manifestations in consciousness, i.e. phenomena or occurrences.

This idea was first formulated explicitly by Kant, and in his terminology this situation could be described as follows: what we know through our consciousness is always a “thing-for-us” and not a “thing-in-itself” .

However, phenomenologists and, in particular, Husserl went further, generally denying the Kantian “thing-in-itself.” So, if our consciousness somehow works with this “thing-in-itself” (at least by asserting its unknowability, being outside of consciousness, etc.), then it thereby turns out to be a “thing-for-us”, those. also a phenomenon of consciousness. If consciousness in no way deals with the “thing-in-itself,” then the latter simply does not exist for consciousness.

From this follows the general conclusion that the sharp opposition between the cognizing subject and the cognizable object, which has been dominant in European philosophy since the time of Plato, must be eliminated, “since any cognizable object is just a phenomenon of consciousness 1 .

In everyday life and in the natural sciences, we are dealing with a naive “natural attitude”, in which the external world appears to us as a set of objectively existing things, their properties and relationships. And the working consciousness of the thinking subject is directed towards this objective world opposing man. From the position of phenomenology, the only reality with which consciousness deals and with which it can only deal are phenomena, or phenomena of consciousness. And from this point of view, the differences between things of the objective world and mental experiences are in a certain sense erased: both of them turn out to be just material with which consciousness works.

The task of the phenomenologist is to study the activity of consciousness itself: to identify the structure and fundamental acts of pure consciousness (i.e., consciousness as such), distinguishing the form of these acts and structures from their content. To do this, you need to clear your consciousness using special methods (phenomenological reduction).

Having arrived at “pure consciousness” through the process of phenomenological reduction, we discover that it is an irreversible and not spatially localized flow of phenomena. We cannot look at it “from above”, “from below” or “from the side”, standing above it, being outside of it (for this, consciousness would have to go beyond its limits, i.e. cease to be consciousness); it is possible to comprehend it only by “swimming in the stream.” But, studying it, we discover that it has its own structure and relative orderliness, which is what allows us to identify individual phenomena as its elementary units.

The fate of the teaching. The study of the structures of “pure consciousness”, carried out in phenomenology, made it possible to approach the comprehension of the processes of meaning formation and communication, the very possibility of understanding, and played a significant role in the formulation and study of the most pressing problem of modern computer science - the problem of “artificial intelligence”. It is no coincidence that Husserl is often called the “grandfather” of “artificial intelligence.”

1 It is interesting to note that Nietzsche also spoke out against the sharp opposition of subject and object in European philosophy, although on somewhat different grounds.

Phenomenology had a tremendous influence on all Western philosophy of the 20th century, especially on existentialism, hermeneutics, postmodernism, etc. This influence was so great that one can speak of a “phenomenological turn” in Western philosophy.

Husserl

Biographical information. Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) - an outstanding German philosopher, a Jew by profession.

origin (from a family of merchants), born and lived in Germany. From 1868 to 1876 he studied at the gymnasium, where he was not very successful 1 . After graduating from high school, he studied at the Universities of Leipzig and Berlin, where he studied astronomy, mathematics, physics and philosophy. In 1882 he defended his dissertation in mathematics. Husserl became interested in philosophy while working as an assistant to the famous mathematician K. Weierstrass in Berlin. True, Husserl’s philosophy was led not only by reflection on the philosophical problems of mathematics, but also by an in-depth study of the New Testament. Philosophy, in his opinion, was the science that allows one to “find the path to God and a righteous life.” In 1886, Husserl listened to lectures by the famous philosopher F. Brentano in Vienna, after which he finally devoted his life to philosophy. In 1887 he defended his doctoral dissertation at the University of Halle, from 1901 to 1916 he taught in Göttingen, from 1916 to 1928 in Freiburg. During the last years of his life, Husserl was persecuted by the Nazi regime. He was fired from his job, and soon completely excluded from the list of professors at the University of Freiburg. Despite the moral terror, he continued his creative work until his death in 1938. According to the old German tradition, when a professor died, the university flag on the university tower was lowered. The honorary professor at the University of Freiburg, the world-famous scientist E. Husserl, was also denied this.

Main works.“Philosophy of Arithmetic. Psychological and logical research" (1891), "Logical research. In 2 volumes." (1900-1901), “Towards the phenomenology of the internal consciousness of time” (lectures 1904-1905), “Philosophy as a strict science” (1911), “Ideas of pure phenomenology” (1913), “Paris reports” (1924), “Map

1 The teachers' council of the gymnasium even expressed the opinion that he would certainly fail the final exams due to his frivolous attitude towards his studies. Having learned about this, Husserl studied the necessary educational material in a matter of hours on the day of the exam and passed the exam brilliantly. The director of the gymnasium, speaking before the examination committee, remarked, not without pride: “Husserl is the worst of our students!”

Zian reflections" (1931), "The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology" (1936).

Much of Husserl's work was not published during his lifetime, and its publication continues to the present day.

Philosophical views. Late XIX - early XX centuries. were marked by a crisis in science (primarily physics and mathematics 1), which led to the revival and widespread dissemination of various areas of irrationalism and skepticism, which questioned the claims of science to the truth of its provisions and the very possibility of obtaining absolutely true knowledge. Husserl was one of the first to defend the ideals of rationalism. His goal was to build philosophy as a strict science, for which he began to develop a new way of thinking and a method that ensured the reliability of the knowledge gained.

Convinced of the existence of absolutely true knowledge (using the example of mathematics and logic), Husserl made an attempt to explore the nature of this knowledge. But for this it was necessary to answer the question: how can absolute truth (laws of logic, principles of mathematics) arise and exist in the individual consciousness of a person? This problem of the relationship between the individual, temporary, limited consciousness of a person and the absolute, ideal, timeless content of scientific knowledge worried Husserl throughout his entire life 2 .

Antipsychologism. Husserl believed that mathematical and logical laws are absolute truths independent of our experience. And therefore, in Logical Investigations, he harshly criticized the so-called psychologism in logic. Representatives of psychologism tried to derive the laws of logic from the laws of the mental process of thinking, thereby making the truth of its laws dependent on the psychological characteristics of the individual consciousness or the consciousness of a person in general. Insisting on the irrespective, absolute nature of logical laws, Husserl emphasized: truth belongs to the realm of meaning, the ideal content of the cognitive acts that make up consciousness. The meaning of the act of judgment “2+2=4” is a truth that does not depend on the physical or psychological characteristics of the subject (mood, desires, etc.), or on any other empirical factors.

The study of the nature of true knowledge forced Husserl to turn to the study of ideal structures of consciousness, which ultimately meant the construction of phenomenology.

1 About the crisis in physics, see p. 451-452, about the crisis in mathematics - on p. 453.

2 In this case, we are dealing with a new formulation of the old philosophical problem about the necessary and universal nature of scientific laws and the limitations of human experience (see diagram 122).

Phenomenology. Phenomenology for Husserl is a science that studies the world of consciousness, the world of phenomena, i.e. objects given to consciousness in various kinds of cognitive acts. Just like Kant, Husserl begins his research with an analysis of the process of cognition. It requires a critical approach to the use of unsubstantiated and untested concepts and ideas that underlie our picture of the world. First of all, the concept of “objective reality” or “reality” was criticized. Husserl demands the abandonment of this concept, “putting it in brackets.”

The natural, or naive, attitude of our consciousness, based on common sense, divides the world into subjective, i.e. the world of consciousness, and the objective one, lying outside consciousness, i.e. the world of things, properties and relationships. As a human being, the philosopher is forced to accept this attitude in order to lead a normal life. But, as a philosopher, he must understand that such an attitude is introduced by the knowing subject himself and is not a necessary characteristic of knowledge in itself. Therefore, it is necessary to get rid of it, which is achieved by using the method era 1- “bracketing” all naive-realistic ideas of natural science, philosophy and “common sense” regarding the external world and man.

The phenomenological era consists in refraining from making judgments about the real objective world (which in most philosophical teachings was the main object of knowledge) and in refusing to consider states of consciousness as “flawed subjectivity.” Thanks to the epoch, the entire space-time world, as well as one’s own “I,” appears as phenomena of consciousness, as “meaningful” objects that it judges, thinks about, evaluates, perceives, etc. Thus, for Husserl, the boundaries of the world turn out to coincide with the boundaries of consciousness (meaning).

In later works, the era plays the role of a preparatory stage phenomenological reduction. As a result, there is a change from a naive cognitive attitude to phenomenological: a person switches attention from objects of the external world to the life of his consciousness.

And as a result, access to pure phenomena of consciousness, meaningful or conscious objects opens up. Phenomenology studies not the physical, but the intentional structure of the world; its subject is not the objective laws of reality, but the meanings of existence.

"Intentionality" Husserl understands it as “direction towards” 2. Our consciousness is intentional, since it is always aimed at

1 From the Greek “stopping, stopping, suspending judgment.”

2 Husserl borrowed the concept of “intentionality” from F. Brentano. In turn, Brentano relied on the medieval concept of “intentio”, which meant “different from oneself”.

an object. We are always thinking about something, evaluating something, imagining something, etc. Thus, two aspects can be distinguished in intentionality: the objective (the object of direction) and the direction itself. Intentionality turns out to be a necessary, a priori ideal structure of consciousness 1 . Analyzing the intentional act of cognition, Husserl identifies two main points in it: noema And noesis. The noema characterizes the act of consciousness, considered from the side of the object; it corresponds to the “what” of the act. Noesis is a characteristic of the direction itself; it corresponds to the “how” of the act.

Scheme 175. Intentional act

For example, consider three acts of consciousness expressed in sentences: 1) “The door is closed.”; 2) “The door is closed!”; 3) “Is the door closed?” In all these three cases, we are dealing with a single “matter”, acts of consciousness are aimed at a single “what”: certain phenomena of consciousness “door” and “closed”. But when we turn to how consciousness is directed towards this “what,” a difference is revealed here: in the first case we are dealing with a statement, in the second with an exclamation, in the third with a question 2.

Scheme 176. Noema and noesis

1 In highlighting the a priori structures of consciousness, Husserl follows Kant, but at the same time intentionality is fundamentally different from those a priori forms that Kant saw in human consciousness.

2 The differences in the directional characteristics are not limited to the three above; they are taken as an example as the simplest and most understandable.

In his Logical Investigations, Husserl proposed an original concept of meaning, linking it with the ideal content of acts of consciousness. In this case, meaning is understood as that identical thing that is preserved in all acts co-directed towards a given “what”. The concept of meaning (essence) has become one of the central ones in phenomenology. Subsequently, Husserl paid much attention to the question of the relationship between different meanings and the identity of the meanings included in the conceptual schemes (“trees of meanings”) of various subjects, which allowed him to explain the problem of different subjects understanding each other, etc.

The problem of the objectivity of scientific knowledge. But how does the phenomenological approach help us solve the initial problem of the relationship between the objectivity of the ideal content of scientific knowledge (meaning) and the subjective consciousness in which this meaning is experienced? To do this, Husserl shifts the focus of research from the individual consciousness of subjects (and their communication) to universal human consciousness, to the consciousness of a certain universal subject (community of people or humanity), for which the objective world appears as a world of general intention. The objective world is now understood as an intersubjective sphere (common to all subjects). The individual “I” becomes intersubjective.

In his last, unfinished work, “The Beginning of Geometry,” Husserl points to one very important characteristic of a community - to be a speaker of language, “the bodily design of meaning.” Language as a carrier of meaning, being a material object, turns out to be woven into the very fabric of the world that is common to different subjects and therefore objective (from the position of individual consciousness) (the world of intentional, meaningful objects). The belonging of a linguistic sign to the general objective world turns out to be a guarantor and condition for the objectivity of ideal meaning and makes understanding and communication possible. Thus, the objective meanings that make up the content of scientific knowledge receive their justification in the experience of the subject (humanity), who is a native speaker.

The crisis of European science and its overcoming. Husserl associates the crisis of European science with the alienation of objective scientific knowledge (the semantic content of knowledge) from the subject. And in the analysis of this crisis, one of the central concepts is "life world" those. world, to which man himself belongs 1. The introduction of the concept of “lifeworld” can be considered a return to the

1 There is no doubt that the “return” from the heights of “pure thinking” to the world in which man lives was also influenced by the blows that Husserl himself received from this world, in particular, persecution from the fascist regime.

natural attitude of consciousness, recognition of the self-evidence of the independent existence of the external world. But it is necessary to take into account that the “objective” world is restored in its rights within the framework of an already phenomenologically reduced consciousness, thereby receiving phenomenological justification.

Based on his main position that the world of people (humanity) is a world of consciousness, Husserl emphasizes: any activity (including science) is in this sense subjective. Husserl associates overcoming the crisis of European science and spiritual culture in general with the recognition of its fundamental subjectivity. He hopes that, by overcoming alienation from the subject, philosophy will lead humanity out of the crisis, transforming it into a humanity “capable of absolute responsibility to itself on the basis of absolute theoretical insights.”

Scheme 177. Husserl: origins and influence

Phenomenology (German Phänomenologie - the doctrine of phenomena) - direction in philosophy XX century, which defined its task as an unpremised description experience cognizer consciousness and highlighting essential, ideal features in it (about consciousness + instinct)

Phenomenology began with a thesis Husserl“Back to the things themselves!”, which is opposed to the calls widespread at that time “Back to Cantu!”, “Back to Hegel!” and means the need to abandon the construction of deductive systems of philosophy, such as Hegelian, as well as from the reduction of things and consciousness to causal connections studied by the sciences. Phenomenology, therefore, involves an appeal to primary experience, in Husserl - to the experience of cognitive consciousness, where consciousness is understood not as an empirical subject for the study of psychology, but as "transcendental self" and “pure meaning-making” ( intentionality). The identification of pure consciousness presupposes preliminary criticism naturalism, psychologism And platonism And phenomenological reduction, according to which we refuse statements regarding the reality of the material world, putting its existence out of brackets.

Edmund Husserl(1859-1938) - German philosopher, student of Brentano. Founder of phenomenology. He argued that philosophy does not yet exist as a science. Husserl developed the basic principles of phenomenology, the only discipline capable, in his opinion, of making philosophy a strict and exact science. According to Husserl, the only absolute being is revealed to us. Husserl calls the intention towards an object, directly and in the original, given to consciousness, intuition. Intuition in phenomenology has the following meaning: to see everything that appears as truly manifested, and only as manifested. To complete his theory, he introduces the concept of “constituting”. Consciousness is a constitutive flow.

Husserl's phenomenology had a direct influence on M. Heidegger and all of existentialism, M. Scheler, N. Hartmann and others.

Husserl puts forward the goal of building a universal science (universal philosophy, universal ontology), relating to the “comprehensive unity of existence,” which would have an absolutely strict justification and serve as the justification for all other sciences, knowledge in general. Phenomenology should become such a science.

Phenomenology explores and brings into system the a priori in consciousness; reducing the a priori to the “last... essential necessities”, it thereby sets the basic concepts for the sciences [. The task of phenomenology is “to understand the complete system of formations of consciousness that constitute” the (immanent) objective world.

32.Philosophical hermeneutics

Hermeneutics- direction to philosophy XX century, grown on the basis theories interpretation of literary texts. From the point of view of hermeneutics, the task of philosophy is to interpret crop limit values, because the reality we see through cultural lens, which is a collection founding texts. Theorist and (or) practitioner in the field biblical (theological), philosophical or philological called hermeneutics hermeneutom.

In a broad sense, the concept of “hermeneutics” can have the following meanings:

the art of interpretation (interpretation) of texts,

theory of understanding, comprehension of meaning,

the art of understanding someone else's individuality,

teachings about the principles of the humanities.

Although the history of hermeneutics can be traced through the Middle Ages to antiquity, the concept of hermeneutics in its modern meaning dates back to modern times. Around the middle of the 17th century. a distinction is established between the course of interpretation and its method: hermeneutics as the doctrine of the “rules” of interpretation begins to be separated from exegesis (as the practice of commenting devoid of methodological reflection). A revolutionary step in the establishment of hermeneutics as an independent discipline was made by Schleiermacher, who fundamentally expanded the scope of texts subject to interpretation: for Schleiermacher, this is the “teaching of the art of understanding” written documents in general. The task of hermeneutics is to clarify the conditions that make it possible to understand the meaning of a particular text. Every written document, according to Schleiermacher, is a linguistic discovery that has a dual nature: on the one hand, it is part of the general system of language, on the other, it is a product of the creativity of an individual. Hermeneutics therefore faces a double task: the study of linguistic discovery as an element of a particular language system and, at the same time, as a discovery of the unique subjectivity behind it. The first part of the task is performed by the “objective” (or “grammatical”) interpretation, the second by the “technical” (or “psychological”) interpretation. Grammatical interpretation analyzes the text as part of a certain lexical system, while psychological interpretation analyzes the individual style, i.e. combinations of expressions not specified by the lexical system.

An important stage in the development of hermeneutics was Dilthey’s “philosophy of life” , within which hermeneutics is assigned a special methodological function. Dilthey is credited with systematically developing the thesis according to which “understanding” is not a particular aspect of the theory of knowledge, but the foundation of humanitarian knowledge (“spiritual sciences”) in general. This position of Dilthey, however, was prepared by intense discussions in historical (I.G. Droysen) and philological (A. Böck) science in the second half of the 19th century. Droysen, in particular, drew attention to the methodological flaw that prevents historiography from becoming a science. The method of historical knowledge, according to Droysen, should be “understanding.” The subject of the latter is not objective facts, but what has already been interpreted at one time; The work of the historian is the “understanding grasp” of what was once understood. A. Böck interprets the tasks of humanitarian knowledge in a similar way. The documents with which the philologist deals already contain knowledge and are the result of a past process of cognition. Hence the special productivity of philology, which, according to A. Böck’s formula, is “knowledge of the known

The doctrine of phenomena

Phenomenology, if you delve into the decoding of this word, you can understand that phenomenology is the doctrine that deals with the study of phenomena. The doctrine of phenomena is a direction in the philosophy of the $XX$ century. Phenomenology defines its main task as an unpremised description of the experience of cognizing consciousnesses and the identification of essential features in it.

Note 1

Phenomenology begins with Edmund Husserl's thesis “Back to the things themselves!” This thesis was contrasted with the quotes common at that time: “Back to Kant!”, “Back to Hegel!” and meant the need to abandon the construction of a deductive system of philosophy, like Hegel’s. And it was also necessary to abandon the reduction of things and consciousnesses to the causal connection that is studied by science. Thus, phenomenology is defined by an appeal to primary experience; in Edmund Husserl it is addressed to the experiences of cognizing consciousnesses, where consciousness is presented not as an empirical subject of study of psychology, but as a “transcendental Self” and “pure meaning formation,” which can also be called intentionality.

The identification of pure consciousness requires preliminary criticism of naturalism, psychologism and platonism and phenomenological reductions, according to which a person refuses statements regarding the realities of the material worlds when his existence is taken out of brackets.

History of phenomenology

The founder of this direction is Edmund Husserl ($1859 - 1938$ years). Franz Brentano and Karl Stumpf are considered to be the predecessors in this substantive movement. The starting point of phenomenological movements can be determined by Edmund Husserl’s book “Logical Investigations”, the main category of which is the concept of intentionality.

Highlights

The main points in the development of phenomenology are the emergence of its various interpretations and the opposition of its main options.

The teachings of Husserl and Heidegger, in turn, Heidegger is contradictory to the phenomenological concept. Through these teachings, concepts appear in the fields of phenomenological psychology and psychiatry, aesthetics, law and sociology. Thus, we will already be talking about the phenomenological sociology of A. Schutz, that is, about social constructivism. Also, it should be mentioned the concepts of philosophy of religion, ontology, where you can record such personalities as J.-P. Sartre, R. Ingarden and N. Hartmann. Other currents and scientific meaning-making concepts are also touched upon, such as the philosophy of mathematics and natural science, history and metaphysics according to Landgrebe, the theory of communications by Vilém Flusser, and Shpet’s hermeneutics. Influences on existentialism, personalism, hermeneutics and other philosophical movements, widespread in Europe, America, Japan and some other Asian countries.

Phenomenology centers

Large centers of phenomenology can be called:

the Husserl archives in Louvain, Belgium and Cologne, Germany;
International Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Education in the USA, publishing the annual Analecta Husserliana and the journal Phenomenology Inquiry.

Problems of phenomenology

Edmund Husserl defines the goal of building a universal science in order to study universal philosophy and universal ontology in its entirety. It should also be mentioned about the relationship to the “comprehensive unity of existence,” which can have an absolute, strict justification and serves as a justification for all other sciences, and knowledge in general. Phenomenology should have such content in science.

Note 2

Phenomenology considers and contributes to bringing into the system a priori consciousness, which can be reduced to the “last essential necessities”, thereby defining the main concepts of scientific research. The task of phenomenology can be traced “in the knowledge of the complete system of formations of consciousness that constitute,” that is, immanently through the objective world.

History of phenomenology

The founder of the movement was Edmund Husserl, and its immediate predecessors included Franz Brentano and Karl Stumpf. The starting point of the phenomenological movement is Husserl’s book Logical Investigations, the core of which is the concept of intentionality.

The main points in the development of phenomenology: the emergence of its diverse interpretations and the opposition of its main variants, the teachings of Husserl and Heidegger (whose attitude to phenomenology is called contradictory); the emergence of phenomenological psychology and psychiatry (F. Basaglia: 680, L. Binswanger: 680, D. G. Cooper: 680, R. D. Laing: 680, E. Minkovsky, Yu. S. Savenko, E. Straus, V. von Gebsattel, G. Ellenberger, K. Jaspers:680), ethics (Scheler), aesthetics (Ingarden, Dufrenne), law (Reinach) and sociology (phenomenological sociology of A. Schutz, social constructivism), philosophy of religion, ontology (J. -P. Sartre, partly N. Hartmann), philosophy of mathematics and natural science, history and metaphysics (Landgrebe), communication theory (Wilem Flusser), hermeneutics (Shpet); influence on existentialism, personalism, hermeneutics and other philosophical movements; widespread in Europe, America, Japan and some other Asian countries. The largest centers of phenomenology are the Husserl Archives in Louvain (Belgium) and Cologne (Germany), the International Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Education (USA), which publishes the annual Analecta Husserliana and the journal Phenomenology Inquiry.

Husserl's Phenomenology

Problems of phenomenology

Phenomenology explores and brings into system the a priori in consciousness; reducing the a priori to the “last... essential necessities”, it thereby sets the basic concepts for the sciences. The task of phenomenology is “to understand the complete system of formations of consciousness that constitute” the (immanent) objective world.

Phenomenology method

Methods for carrying out phenomenological research are direct contemplation (obviousness) And phenomenological reductions.

Direct contemplation, as a method of phenomenology, means that the latter is descriptive science, and its material is exclusively the data of direct intuition.

Phenomenological reductions are divided into three types. First, pure phenomenology abstracts from natural installation, that is, naive immersion in the external world, and focuses attention on the very act (experience) of consciousness in which the world is given to us ( phenomenological-psychological reduction). Secondly, phenomenology takes these experiences of consciousness not as concrete facts, but as ideal entities ( eidetic reduction). Thirdly, phenomenology does not stop at reduction to the experiences of consciousness, and then not only the external world, but also the sphere of the soul, consciousness - as the flow of experiences of a specific empirical subject - is reduced to pure consciousness (transcendental reduction).

So, phenomenology, abstracting from the existing, considers essence- possible, a priori in consciousness. “The ancient teaching of ontology - knowledge of “possibilities” must precede knowledge of reality - this, in my opinion, is a great truth - if only it is understood correctly and correctly put to the service of the cause.” Moreover, it is a descriptive science limited to the immediate intuition (obviousness), that is, its method is direct intuitive contemplation of entities (ideation). Moreover, it is a descriptive science of essence transcendentally pure experiences. Thus, phenomenology - descriptive science of the essences of transcendentally pure experiences within the limits of immediate intuition. “...The field of phenomenology is an analysis of what is revealed a priori in direct intuition, fixations of directly perceived entities and their interrelations and their descriptive cognition in the systemic union of all layers in transcendentally pure consciousness.”

Conducting a phenomenological study

The first methodological principle, the criterion for the validity of something, is obviousness. It is necessary to establish the first evidence that will form the basis of reliable knowledge. These obvious things must be apodictic: what is obvious now may become doubtful later, turn out to be an appearance, an illusion; “Apodictic evidence has the remarkable feature that it not only generally certifies the existence of things obvious in it or the circumstances associated with them, but at the same time, through critical reflection, it is revealed as the simple unthinkability of their non-existence.”

One can doubt the existence of the world - this is not apodictic evidence. Carrying out a transcendental-phenomenological reduction (epoch), making the world only an experience, a phenomenon, reveals that “as a more primary being in itself, it is preceded by the being of pure ego and him cogitationes"(that is, pure consciousness and its experiences, taken as essences). This is the desired apodictic evidence. . After this, it is necessary to establish further absolute evidence - “the universal apodictic structure of the experience of the Self [transcendental experience] (for example, the immanent temporal form of the flow of experiences).” Thus, transcendental phenomenology is the science of the transcendental ego and “what is contained in itself” (transcendental experience): the self-interpretation of the transcendental ego, showing how it constitutes the transcendental in itself; the study of all possible types of existence (given to us as the content of consciousness). This is a transcendental theory of knowledge (in contrast to the traditional one, where the main problem is the problem of the transcendental, meaningless in phenomenology) - transcendental idealism .

Notes

Literature

Classics of phenomenology

Husserl E. Ideas towards pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy. T. 1. M.: DIK, 1999.
Husserl E. Cartesian reflections / Trans. with him. D. V. Sklyadneva. St. Petersburg: Nauka, 2001.
Husserl E. Logical research. T. 2. - M.: DIK, 2001.
Heidegger M. Being and time / M. Heidegger; Per. with him. V.V. Bibikhina. - Kharkov: “Folio”, 2003. - 503, p. - (Philosophy) - ISBN 966-03-1594-5.
Shpet G. Phenomenon and meaning (Phenomenology as a basic science and its problems). M.: Hermes, 1914. 219 p.
Ingarden R. Introduction to the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl / Trans. A. Denezhkin, V. Kurennogo. M.: House of Intellectual Books, 1999.
Merleau-Ponty M. Phenomenology of perception () / Transl. from fr. edited by I. S. Vdovina, S. L. Fokina. - St. Petersburg: Yuventa; Science, 1999.

Literature on phenomenology

Handbook of Phenomenological Aesthetics. Edited by Hans Rainer Sepp and Lester Embree. (Series: Contributions To Phenomenology, Vol. 59) Springer, Dordrecht / Heidelberg / London / New York 2010. ISBN 978-90-481-2470-1
Herbert Spiegelberg. Phenomenological movement. M., 2003.
Tymieniecka A.-T. Phenomenology World-Wide: Foundations, Expending Dynamics, Life-Engagements: A Guide for Research and Study. / Edited by A.-T. Tymieniecka. - NY: Springer, 2002. - 740 pages. - ISBN 1-4020-0066-9

Phenomenological periodicals

Newsletter of Phenomenology.(online-newsletter)
Research in Phenomenology. Duquesne Univ. Pr., Pittsburgh Pa. 1.1971ff. ISSN 0085-5553
Studia Phaenomenologica. ISSN 1582-5647

Links

Article “Phenomenology” from the “Phenomenological Dictionary” by I. S. Shkuratov
Article “Phenomenology” from the encyclopedia “History of Philosophy”, ed. A. A. Gritsanova (Mn., 2002)

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- (from the Greek phainomenon, which is) one of the main trends in philosophy of the 20th century. The founder of this direction is E. Husserl, the immediate predecessors are F. Brentano and K. Stumpf. Starting point F. book. Husserl “Logical Investigations” (vol. 1 2,... ... Philosophical Encyclopedia

A direction in the philosophy of culture that arose at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. in the works of Husserl and further developed by his students and followers. Initially it was considered not so much as a culturological, but as a general philosophical one. discipline...... Encyclopedia of Cultural Studies

- 'PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION' ('Phénoménologie de la perception'. Paris, 1945) is the main work of Merleau Ponty, which explores the problems of the specificity of the existence of existence (see EXISTENCE) and its relationship with the world as 'life... ...

phenomenology- PHENOMENOLOGY is one of the main trends in philosophy of the 20th century. The founder of this direction is E. Husserl, the immediate predecessors are F. Brentano and K. Stumpf. Starting point F. Brentano’s book “Psychology from an empirical point of view”... ... Encyclopedia of Epistemology and Philosophy of Science

- 'PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SPIRIT' ('Phénoménologie des Geistes') is the first of Hegel’s major works, which was at the same time the first expression of his entire system of absolute idealism. Dedicated to the analysis of forms of development or phenomena (phenomena) of knowledge. Prepared for... ... History of Philosophy: Encyclopedia

PHILOSOPHY OF CULTURE, philosophical study of the principles and general laws of culture (see CULTURE). Culturology (see CULTUROLOGY) should be distinguished from the philosophy of culture as a special humanitarian science. Background to the philosophy of culture... ... encyclopedic Dictionary

; direction in philosophy of the 20th century, based E. Husserlem .

I. Phenomenology as a philosophical concept was first used in I. Lambert’s work “New Organon”, where it denotes one of the parts of the general scientific doctrine, the theory of appearance (Theorie des Scheinens). This concept is then adopted by Herder, applying it to aesthetics, and Kant. Kant had an idea, which he communicated to Lambert: to develop a phaenomenologie generalis, i.e. general phenomenology as a propaedeutic discipline that would precede metaphysics and perform the critical task of establishing the boundaries of sensibility and establishing the independence of the judgments of pure reason. In “Metaphysical Primary Foundations of Natural Science,” Kant defines the meaning and goals of phenomenology in a slightly different sense. It is inscribed in the pure doctrine of movement as that part of it that analyzes movement in the light of the categories of modality, i.e. opportunity, chance, necessity. Phenomenology now acquires from Kant not only a critical, but also a positive meaning: it serves to transform the phenomenon and the manifested (manifested movement) into experience. In Hegel's early philosophy, phenomenology (spirit) is understood as the first part of philosophy, which should serve as the foundation for the remaining philosophical disciplines - logic, philosophy of nature and philosophy of spirit (see. "Phenomenology of Spirit" ). In Hegel’s mature philosophy, phenomenology refers to that part of the philosophy of spirit, which, in the section on subjective spirit, is located between anthropology and psychology and explores consciousness, self-awareness, reason ( Hegel G.V.F. Works, vol. III. M., 1956, p. 201–229). In the 20th century the concept and concept of phenomenology took on new life and new meaning thanks to Husserl.

Husserl's phenomenology is a broad, potentially endless field of methodological, as well as epistemological, ontological, ethical, aesthetic, social and philosophical studies of any topic of philosophy through a return to the phenomena of consciousness and their analysis. The main principles and approaches of Husserl’s phenomenology, which basically retain their significance at all stages of its evolution and, with all reservations, are recognized in various (though not all) modifications of phenomenology as a direction:

1) the principle according to which “every original (original) given contemplation is the true source of knowledge”, Husserl calls the “principle of all principles” of philosophy (Husserliana, further: Hua, Bd. III, 1976, S. 25). The program document of early phenomenology (Introduction to the first issue of the Yearbook of Phenomenology and Phenomenological Research) stated that “only through a return to the original sources of contemplation and to the insights of essences (Wesenseinsichten) drawn from them can the great traditions of philosophy be preserved and renewed”; 2) carrying out phenomenological analysis, philosophy must become an eidetic science (i.e., the science of essences), about at the discretion of the entity (Wesensschau), to move towards which it is first necessary to form a specific attitude, motivation (Einstellung) of research interest, opposite to the naive “natural attitude”, which is typical both for everyday life and for the “factual sciences” of the natural science cycle (Hua, III, S. 6, 46, 52). If the world in a natural attitude appears as “a world of things, goods, values, as a practical world”, as a directly given, present reality, then in an edeic phenomenological attitude, the “givenness” of the world is precisely called into question, requiring a specific analysis; 3) liberation from the natural attitude requires the use of special methodological procedures of a “cleansing” nature. This method is phenomenological reduction . “We deprive the general thesis of the natural attitude of its effectiveness by at once bracketing everything and everyone that it covers in the optical - therefore, we deprive this entire “natural world” of significance” (Hua, III, S. 67). The result of the execution of phenomenological reduction is the movement of “pure consciousness” to the research soil; 4) “pure consciousness” is a complex unity of structural elements and essential relationships of consciousness modeled by phenomenology. This is not only the subject of analysis of phenomenology, but also the ground on which Husserl’s transcendentalism requires the translation of any philosophical problematic. The originality and theoretical significance of phenomenology lies in the construction of a complexly mediated, multi-layered model of consciousness (capturing the real features of consciousness, analytically exploring each of them and their intersection using a number of specific procedures of the phenomenological method), as well as in a special theoretical-cognitive, ontological, metaphysical interpretation of this model ; 5) the main modeling features of pure consciousness and, accordingly, the methodological procedures used in their analysis: (1) attention is focused on the fact that consciousness is an irreversible flow that is not localized in space; the task is to methodologically capture the stream of consciousness in order to describe, somehow hold it (mentally “swim with the flow”), despite its irreversibility, at the same time taking into account its relative orderliness, structuredness, which allows us to isolate its integral units for analysis, phenomena ; (2) phenomenology consistently moves from a complete, directly experienced phenomenon to a “reduced” phenomenon. “Every mental experience on the path of phenomenological reduction corresponds to a pure phenomenon that demonstrates its immanent essence (taken separately) as an absolute given” (Hua, Bd. II, 1973, S. 45). To reduce a phenomenon, all empirically specific features are mentally and methodically “cut off” from it; then there is a movement from a linguistic expression to its meaning, from meaning to meanings, i.e. to posited, intentional objects (the path of volume II "Logical Research" ); (3) in the process of phenomenological intentional analysis, a combination of essentially analytical, eidetic, in Husserl’s language, is carried out, i.e. both a priori and at the same time descriptive procedures, meaning a movement towards the intuitive self-givenness of consciousness, the ability to discern essences through them (following the example of pure logic and pure mathematics, for example, geometry, which teaches us to see through a drawn geometric figure the corresponding general mathematical essence and with it the problem, problem, solution); there is a reliance on “pure experiences” correlative entities, i.e. ideas, thoughts, imaginations, memories; (4) intentionality as an essential feature of phenomenology is intentional analysis as a specific study, separately and in their intersection, of three aspects: intentional objects (noema, plural: noema), acts (noesis) and the “pole of the Self”, from which intentional procedures flow; (5) in his later works, Husserl widely introduces into phenomenology the theme of constitution (constitution) as the reconstruction through pure consciousness and its reduced phenomena of the structures of a thing, thingness, body and corporeality, spirit and spiritual, the world as a whole; (6) equally, on the basis of a multilateral analysis of the “pure Self” (unfolding into a whole phenomenological subdiscipline, egology), phenomenology constitutes the time of the world through temporality (Zeitlichkeit) as a property of consciousness, constitutes intersubjectivity, i.e. other selves, their worlds, their interactions; (7) late phenomenology also introduces profiling themes "life world" , communities, the telos of history as such (in the book "The crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology" ). In his later works, Husserl introduces a genetic aspect into phenomenology. He divides all syntheses carried out by consciousness into active and passive. Active syntheses (they were mainly discussed in “Logical Investigations”) - i.e. the results of the activity of the Self, unified [structural] formations (Einheitsstiftungen), which acquire an objective, ideal character. Thanks to them, there is a unity of experience regarding the world and regarding the I as a self (Ich-selbst). Passive syntheses are: 1) kinesthetic consciousness, i.e. consciousness associated with body movements: with their help, sensory fields and space of the life world are constituted; 2) associations with the help of which the first structures of the “sensory field” are formed. In this new aspect, phenomenology outlines a deep and interesting program for the study of general and universal objectivity (active synthesis) and “lower”, ambivalent forms, objectivity of consciousness, previously called sensibility (passive synthesis). Phenomenology is increasingly including in the orbit of its research such topics as “kinesthesia” (mobility) of the human body, constitution consciousness of “physical” things and thingness as such. Accordingly, Husserl and his followers are increasingly interested in such “primordial” acts of consciousness as direct sensory perception. Until now, we have been talking about phenomenology in its own (narrow) sense, how E. Husserl created and modified it and how it was (selectively and critically) perceived by his most faithful followers.

II. Phenomenology has never been a single and homogeneous phenomenological direction. But we can talk about it as a “phenomenological movement” (G. Spiegelberg), as phenomenology in the broad sense of the word. Early phenomenology in Germany at the beginning of the 20th century. arose parallel to Husserl's phenomenology, and then experienced its influence. Thus, representatives of the Munich circle of phenomenologists (A. Pfender, M. Geiger) began developments related to Husserl’s, under the influence of K. Stumpf, H. Lipps; then - in temporary collaboration with Husserl - they took up some phenomenological topics, especially the method of "discernment of essences." In Husserl’s phenomenology, they were most attracted to such moments as a return to the intuitive, contemplative “self-givenness” of consciousness and the possibility through them to come to an intuitively obvious verification of meanings. Göttingen students and followers of Husserl, led by A. Reinach (X. Conrad-Martius, D. von Hildebrand, A. Koyre, etc.) accepted and understood phenomenology as a strictly scientific method of direct observation of essences and rejected Husserl’s phenomenological idealism as transcendentalist, fraught subjectivism and solipsism view of the world, man and knowledge. They extended phenomenology to existential, ontological, ethical, historical, scientific and other studies.

In the teachings of M. Scheler, who was influenced by Husserl, as well as the Munich and Göttingen phenomenologists, but who early embarked on an independent path of development, phenomenology is neither a special science nor a strictly developed method, but only a designation of the attitude of spiritual vision in which one looks ( er-schauen) or experience (er-leben) something that remains hidden without this attitude: “facts” of a certain kind. Derivatives of phenomenological facts are “natural” (self-given) and “scientific” (artificially constructed) facts. Scheler applied his understanding of phenomenology as “leading to contemplation”, the discovery and disclosure of phenomenological facts to the development of the phenomenology of feelings of sympathy and love, values and ethical will, sociologically interpretable forms of knowledge and cognition. In the center, therefore, was the phenomenology of man, human personality, “eternal in man.”

N. Hartmann's ontology also contains phenomenological elements. He stands in solidarity (for example, in the work Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis. V., 1925, S. V) with such achievements of phenomenology as criticism of empiricism, psychologism, positivism, as a defense of objectivity, the independence of the logical, as a return to “essential description” . “We have methods for such an essential description in the procedures of phenomenology” (S. 37). But while approving the methodological arsenal of phenomenology, Hartmann rejects Husserl's transcendentalism and interprets phenomenology in the spirit of his ontological philosophy of “critical realism”: the object that we call intentional exists outside and independently of the intentional act. Knowledge of an object is knowledge of being independent of the subject (S. 51). Therefore, the theory of knowledge is ultimately directed not at the intentional, but at the “in-itself” (S. 110). In the philosophy of Husserl's student, the Polish philosopher R. Ingarden, phenomenology was understood as a useful method (Ingarden himself applied it mainly to aesthetics and literary theory); However, Husserl's subjectivist-transcendentalist interpretation of the world, the Self, consciousness and its products was rejected.

Outside of Germany, Husserl was known for a long time. as the author of Logical Investigations. Publishing them in Russia ( Husserl E. Logical Studies, vol. 1. St. Petersburg, 1909) is one of the relatively early foreign publications of this work. (True, only the first volume was translated and published, which determined the “logistic” perception of phenomenology in Russia for many years.) They participated in the development and critical interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenology already in the first decades of the 20th century. such significant Russian philosophers as G. Chelpanov (his review of Husserl’s “Philosophy of Arithmetic” was published in 1900); G. Lanz (who appreciated Husserl’s dispute with psychologists and independently developed the theory of objectivity); S. Frank (already in “The Subject of Knowledge”, 1915, deeply and completely, at that time, analyzed Husserl’s phenomenology), L. Shestov, B. Yakovenko (who presented to the Russian public not only the volume I of “Logical Investigations”, familiar to her from the translation, but also volume II, demonstrating the specificity of phenomenology); G. Shpet (who gave a quick and vivid response to Husserl’s “Ideas I” in the book “Appearance and Meaning”, 1914) and others. Phenomenology became more widespread in Europe after the 1st World War thanks to philosophers such as the theologian Hering . Due to the popularity of early phenomenology in Russia, a special role in its spread in Europe was played by Russian and Polish scientists who studied for some time in Germany and then moved to France (A. Koyre, G. Gurvich, E. Minkovsky, A. Kozhev, A. Gurvich). L. Shestov and N. Berdyaev, although they were critical of phenomenology and less involved in its development, were also involved in the dissemination of its impulses ( Spiegelberg H. The Phenomenological Movement. A Historical Introduction, v. II. The Hague, 1971, p. 402). During the Freiburg period, a brilliant international circle of scholars arose around Husserl and then Heidegger. At the same time, some phenomenologists (L. Landgrebe, O. Fink, E. Stein, later L. Van Breda, R. Boehm, W. Bimmel) made it their main task to publish the works and manuscripts of Husserl, their commentary and interpretation, in a number of aspects critical and independent. Other philosophers, having gone through the school of Husserl and Heidegger, having received powerful and favorable impulses from phenomenology, then embarked on the path of independent philosophizing.

Heidegger's own attitude to phenomenology is contradictory. On the one hand, in “Being and Time” he outlined the path of combining phenomenology and ontology (with the intention of highlighting the “self-revealing”, i.e., phenomena-related, intuitively obvious structures of Dasein as being-consciousness, here-being). On the other hand, having picked up Husserl’s slogan “Back to the things themselves!”, Heidegger interprets it more in the spirit of a new ontology and hermeneutics than in the traditions of transcendental phenomenology, which the further, the more it is criticized precisely for the “oblivion of being.” Subsequently, after “Being and Time,” Heidegger, when characterizing the specifics of his philosophy, very rarely used the concept of phenomenology, rather giving it a specific methodological meaning. Thus, in his lectures “Basic Problems of Phenomenology,” he called phenomenology one of the methods of ontology.

The most thorough and profound developments of the problems of modern phenomenology belong to the French phenomenologists of the existentialist school J.-P. Sartre (in early works - the development of the concept of “intentionality”, in “Being and Nothingness” - the phenomena of being and being-in-the-world), M. Merlot -Ponty (phenomenological perception - in connection with the themes of the life world, being-in-the-world), P. Ricoeur (transformation, following Heidegger, of transcendentally oriented phenomenology into ontological phenomenology, and then into “hermeneutic” phenomenology), E. Levinas (phenomenological construction of the Other), M. Dufresne (phenomenological aesthetics).

After World War II, phenomenology became widespread on the American continent. The most prominent phenomenologists in the USA are M. Farber, who published the journal “Philosophy and Phenomenological Research” (and is still a popular publication, representing the logical-analytical direction in phenomenology in the last decade); D. Cairns (author of the very useful compendium “Guide for Translating Husserl.” The Hague, 1973; this is a trilingual glossary of the most important phenomenological terms); A. Gurvich (who developed the problems of phenomenology of consciousness, criticized Husserl’s concept of Ego and contributed to the development of phenomenologically oriented philosophy and psychology of language); A. Schutz (Austrian philosopher, author of the famous book “Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt”, 1932; emigrated to the USA and there gave impetus to the development of phenomenological sociology); J. Wilde (who developed “realistic phenomenology” with an emphasis on the phenomenological theory of the “body” and the theory of the life world); M. Natanzon (who applied the phenomenological method to problems of aesthetics and sociology); V. Earl (who developed the problems of phenomenology of everyday life, “phenomenology of events”); J. Eadie (who developed the phenomenology of language and defended the “realistic” version of phenomenology); R. Sokolovsky (interpretation of the phenomenology of consciousness and time); R. Zaner (phenomenology of the body), G. Shpigelberg (author of the two-volume study “Phenomenological Movement”, which went through several editions); A.-T. Tymenetska (student of R. Ingarden, director of the Institute of Phenomenological Research, publisher of “Analecta Husserliana”, phenomenologist of the existential direction, also dealing with the problems of phenomenology of literature and art, phenomenology of psychology and psychiatry); phenomenologists of the analytical direction - H. Dreyfus (phenomenology and artificial intelligence), D. Smith and R. MacIntyre (analytical phenomenology and problems of intentionality).

In modern Germany, phenomenological research is concentrated primarily (although not exclusively) around the archives of Husserl and other centers of phenomenology - in Cologne (the most prominent phenomenologists are E. Strecker, W. Klasges, L. Eli, P. Jansen; the current director of the archive is K. Düsing and others), in Freiburg an der Breisgau, where phenomenology appears in the form of existential phenomenology, in Bochum (B. Waldenfels school), in Wuppertal (K. Held), in Trier (E.V. Orth, publishing the annual magazine "Phänomenologische Forschungen"). German philosophers are also working on Husserl's manuscripts. But the main activity of publishing manuscripts, works of Husserl (Husserlian), series of phenomenological studies (Phaenomenologica) is carried out under the auspices of the Louvain archive. For some time (thanks to the work of R. Ingarden) Poland was one of the centers of phenomenological aesthetics, and in Czechoslovakia, thanks to the prominent phenomenologist J. Patochka, phenomenological traditions were preserved.

In the post-war years, much attention was paid by researchers to the topic “Phenomenology and Marxism” (the Vietnamese-French philosopher Tran-duc-tao, the Italian philosopher Enzo Paci, the Yugoslav philosopher Ante Pazhanin, and the German researcher B. Waldenfels contributed to its development). Research into phenomenology, starting from the 1960s, was actively carried out in the USSR (research by V. Babushkin, K. Bakradze, A. Bogomolov, A. Bochorishvili, P. Gaidenko, A. Zotov, L. Ionin, Z. Kakabadze, M Kissel, M. Kule, M. Mamardashvili, Y. Matyusa, A. Mikhailov, N. Motroshilova, A. Rubenis, M. Rubene, T. Sodeiki, G. Tavrizyan, E. Solovyova, etc.). Currently in Russia there is a Phenomenological Society, the journal “Logos” is published, and there are research centers for phenomenology at the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Russian State University for the Humanities (See Analecta Husserliana, v. XXVII. Den Haag, 1989 - an extensive volume devoted to the development of phenomenology in Central and Eastern Europe). Phenomenology (alloyed with existentialism) has become widespread in recent years in Asian countries (for example, in Japan - Yoshihiro Nitta; see Japanische Beiträge zur Phänomenologie. Freiburg - Münch., 1984).

Literature:

1. Boer Th. de. The Development of Hussel's Thought. The Hague, 1978;

2. Brand G. Welt, Ich und Zeit. Den Haag, 1955;

3. Breda H. L., van Taminiaux J.(Hrsg). Husserl und das Denken der Neuzeit. Den Haag, 1959;

4. Claesges U., Held K.(Hrsg.). Perspektiven Transzendental-phänomenologischer Forschung. Den Haag, 1972;

5. Dimer A. Edmund Husserl. Versuch einer systematischen Darstellung seiner Phänomenologie. Meienheim am Glan, 1965;

6. Dreyfus H.L.(Hrsg.). Husserl, Intentionality and Cognitive Science. Cambr. (Mass.) – L., 1982;

7. Eddie J.M. Speaking and Meaning. The Phenomenology of Language. Bloomington - L., 1976;

8. Phenomenology in America in the Philosophy of Experience, ed. by J.M.Edie. Chi., 1967;

9. Fink F. Studien zur Phänomenologie 1930–1939. Den Haag, 1966;

10. Held K. Lebendige Gegenwart. Die Fragen der Seinsweise des transzendentalen Ich bei Edmund Husserl, entwickelt am Leitfaden der Zeitproblematik. Den Haag, 1966;

11. Kern I. Husserl und Kant. Eine Untersuchung über Husserls Verhältnis zu Kant und zum Neukantianismus. Den Haag, 1964;

12. Kern I. Einleitung des Herausgebers. – Husserl. Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Husserliana, Bd. XIII–XV. Den Haag, 1973;

15. Monanty J.N. The Concept of Intentionality. St. Louis, 1972;

16. Roth A. Edmund Husserls ethische Untersuchungen. Den Haag, 1960;

17. Seebohm Th. Die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit der Transzendentalphilosophie. Edmund Husserls transzendental-phänomenologischer Ansatz, dargestellt im Anschluß an seine Kant-Kritik. Bonn, 1962;

18. H.R.Sepp(Hrsg.). Edmund Husserl und phänomenologische Bewegung. Freiburg, 1988;

19. Stroker E., Jansen P. Phänomenologische Philosophie. Freiburg – Münch., 1989;

20. Thugendhat E. Die Wahrheitsbegriffe bei Husserl und Heidegger. V., 1967;

21. Weidenfels V. Das Zwischenreich des Dialogs. Sozialphilosophische Untersuchungen in Anschluß an Edmund Husserl. Den Haag, 1971;

22. Wuchtel K. Bausteine einer Geschichte der Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts. Wien, 1995.

N.V.Motroshilova